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ARTICLES

Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A Reconsideration of
Federal Question Jurisdiction Over Cases of Mixed
State and Federal Law
LINDA

R. HIRSmAN*

INTRODUCTION

Cases in which federal and state law elements are mixed ("hybrid cases")
present very difficult subject matter jurisdiction problems for the federal
courts.' The nature of lawmaking in a federal system means that such cases
are inevitable; experience has shown that they are not uncommon. 2 Determinations about hybrid cases are important, because they mark the limits

* Associate Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of
Law. A.B. 1966, Cornell University; J.D. 1969, University of Chicago. Professor Hirshman
represented the Respondent, Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, in Jackson
Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, A.T.U., 457 U.S. 15 (1982), discussed infra notes 237-51
and accompanying text. I would like to thank my colleague, Professor Linda Silberman, N.Y.U.
Law School, for her suggestions and Jamie Freveletti, student at I.I.T. Chicago-Kent College
of Law, for her research assistance.
I. The phrase "hybrid cases" comes from Ronald Greene's Hybrid State Law in the
Federal Courts, 83 HARv. L. REv. 289 (1969). Such cases arise, according to Greene, when
our two legal systems . . . borrow from one another, simply as a matter of
convenience. Thus federal law often adopts state standards, and, although much
less frequently, the states sometimes borrow federal standards, even in situations
in which the supremacy clause would not so require. For example, the state may
make tortious what is already forbidden by a federal regulatory statute, or private
parties may attempt to harmonize their state contractual obligations with their
rights and obligations under federal law. In each situtation, the state has created
a kind of "hybrid, a combination of state and federal law."
Id. at 291.
Greene accurately foresaw that such a case would pose complex problems of original
federal question jurisdiction but sidestepped them, because of the solution he foresaw in the
implication of a pure federal claim. Id. at 291 n.14, 324-25.
2. Greene, supra note 1, at 289-91. Professor Hart explained the phenomenon in Hart,
Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 CoLuM. L. REv. 489, 495-98 (1954):
The federal law which governs the exercise of state authority is obviously interstitial
law, assuming existence of, and depending for its impact upon, the underlying
bodies of state law. What is less obvious is that the same thing is true of what
has been called the law of affirmative federal governance. As will be emphasized
later, Congress rarely enacts a complete and self-sufficient body of federal law.
The federal statutes are full of references, both explicit and implicit, to the law
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of the exercise of original federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331, and federal adjudication of whole categories of litigation depends upon

where that line is drawn.3 Finally, hybrid cases are interesting, because they
require the legal system to answer the very fundamental structural question

of what the elements of a "case" are and to understand how hybrid cases
4
fit within the language and policy of section 133 1.

Two sorts of hybrid cases pose particularly significant problems in the
exercise of federal question jurisdiction. First, there are cases in which federal
law prescribes a standard of behavior but fails to provide an element of the
claim, such as a remedy for the plaintiff, which is instead provided by state

law. 5 An example of this sort of case in the context of federal question
jurisdiction is Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway. 6 In Moore, the federal
statute prescribed safety standards for railroads expressly enforceable by

interstate employees but did not authorize enforcement by the plaintiff, an
employee whose work was strictly intrastate. The second sort of cases are

those in which Congress has provided a substantive standard, and the remedy

of some state. As a result, legal problems repeatedly fail to come wrapped up in
neat packages marked "all-federal" or "all-state." It is necessary to dissect the
elements of the problems and identify those which depend upon state law and
those which depend upon federal. When mixed problems of this kind arise in
state court litigation the state court must necessarily decide the federal questions,
and vice versa.
Id. at 498.
See also Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383 (1964); Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism, The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954);
Note, The FederalCommon Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1969); Note, Implying Civil Remedies
From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963).
3. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
4. Although the Constitution allots the creation and jurisdiction of lower federal courts to
Congress, the importance of those courts in the federal system has long been recognized. In
its landmark study of the subject in 1969, the American Law Institute endorsed federal question
jurisdiction "to protect litigants relying on federal law from the danger that state courts will
not properly apply that law, either through misunderstanding or lack of sympathy." ALI STUDY
OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 4 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as ALI STUDY]. In his comprehensive contemporaneous study, David Currie expanded
on the subject:
Federal judges have relative expertise in dealing with federal law; uniform interpretation is promoted by federal jurisdiction; state courts may be hostile to federal
law. Supreme Court review of state courts, limited by narrow review of facts,
the debilitating possibilities of delay, and the necessity of deferring to adequate
state grounds of decision, cannot do the whole job.
Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, (Parts I & II), 36 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1, 268 (1969).
5. See infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text. See also Cohen, The Broken Compass:
The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890,
897-99 (1967); Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MAR. L. REV.
683, 684-87 (1981); Greene, supra note 1, at 296-309; Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the
District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 165-68 (1953).
6. 291 U.S. 205 (1934). See infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
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is inherent in the statute, such as where Congress has established a legal
relationship normally enforceable in private court actions, but where Congress has not specified that the private actions will be brought to federal
court. An example of this second sort of case is Jackson Transit Authority
v. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union 7 where the federal
statute mandated the making and contents of an agreement, traditionally
enforceable by an action in contract, but did not specify that such contract
actions be cognizable in the federal courts.
In the Moore hybrid, Congress has explicitly provided all the elements of
a federal case save one-the plaintiff's role in the enforcement scheme.
Accordingly, the courts must look to state law to supply the missing element.
In the Jackson Transit hybrid, Congress supplies all the case elements, but
the enforcement elements are implicit in its use of a legal relationship like
a contract, rather than explicit. Accordingly, courts must look to the common
law of contracts-normally the province of the states-to supply the enforcement implications of Congress' scheme. As an analytic matter, looking to
state law to supply words of enforcement is quite close to looking to state
law to supply the legal implications of Congress' own words. Thus, the two
sorts of cases are very close on the continuum regarding what Congress must
do to create the elements of a case for federal jurisdictional purposes.
The first sort of hybrid case has elicited a substantial amount of commentary, directed mostly to determining when the role of the federal standard
is sufficiently substantial to qualify the case for federal jurisdiction. 8 Most
of the commentary has concluded that such a problem is not susceptible to
principled analysis and, therefore, is also not susceptible to objective decisionmaking. 9 This traditional theory has been interpreted to require federal
jurisdiction if the complaint discloses a need for a federal court to determine
the meaning or application of federal law.' 0 Commentators have suggested
that the federal law proposition must be "direct"" or, at least, "substantial." ' 2 The decision regarding substantiality is "pragmatic" and includes
such considerations as the caseload of the federal courts and the need for

7.
8.

457 U.S. 15 (1982).
Cohen, supra note 5, at 896-903; Currie, supra note 4, at 276-79. Field, supra note 5,

at 687-90; Greene, supra note 1, at 324; Hornstein, Federalism, JudicialPower and the "Arising
Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A HierarchicalAnalysis, 56 IND. L. REv. 563, 56575 (1981); London, "Federal Question" Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion, 57 MICH. L.
REv. 835, 836-41 (1959); Mishkin, supra note 5, at 163-72; Note, The Outer Limits of "Arising
Under," 54 N.Y.U. L. Rav.-978, 990-95 (1979); ALI STUDY, supra note 4, at 70-71.
9. Cohen, supra note 5, at 891-92; Currie, supra note 4, at 297; Field, supra note 5, at 693;
Greene, supra note 1, at 294; Note, supra note 8, at 980-81 and n.15. This theory will be
referred to hereafter as the traditional theory of jurisdiction.
10. See Judge Friendly's oft-cited opinion in T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).

11. Cohen, supra note 5, at 896.
12. Note, supra note 8, at 979.
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Under this flexible standard, the

federal courts have been basically acting on their intuition in making these
4

jurisdictional decisions.'
Little has been said about the second hybrid type. As set forth below,

the few such cases to reach the Supreme Court on jurisdictional grounds

were sustained under section 1331 without much analysis. 5 One commentator
did pick up the problem, in analyzing the jurisdictional problems of actions
under the federal Trust Indenture Act, which establishes a private relationship
like the statute in Jackson Transit.6 Although he accurately perceived the
problem as a matter of federal jurisdiction, rather than as an implied private
claim, the commentator proposed, foreshadowing the test later suggested by
Justice Powell, that the jurisdiction question be answered by an inquiry into
7
congressional intent.
The recent conservative direction of the Burger Supreme Court has thick-

ened the plot somewhat. As has often been remarked, the Court's commitment to reducing the business of the federal courts has been one of its most
salient characteristics.' 8 This undertaking bears on the problem of hybrid
cases in two ways. The Supreme Court has greatly restricted the federal
courts from implying from federal standards the other elements of a case

such as a private claim for relief as a matter of federal substantive law.
As a result, there are fewer "pure federal claims,"

20

9

and the federal courts

confront more hybrid cases, in which state law provides the source of some
of the claim. In addition, when confronted with the original source of federal

court business-the defining jurisdictional statutes-the Court has indicated a

13. Cohen, supra note 5, at 916.
14. Powers v. South Cent. United Food & Commercial Workers Unions, 719 F.2d 760
(5th Cir. 1983); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Brown, 707 F.2d 1217 (l1th Cir. 1983);
Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1983); Wisconsin v. Baker,
698 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1983); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d
486 (2d Cir. 1968); McFaddin Express, Inc. v. Adley Corp., 346 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966); Sweeney v. Abramovitz, 449 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1978).
15. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb. Dropkin, Implied Liability Under the Trust Indenture Act:
Trends and Prospects, 52 TUL. L. REv. 299 (1978).
17. This article is largely directed at rebutting this suggestion. See infra notes 253-311 and
accompanying text.
18. Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term, 95 HAsv. L. Rav. 17 (1981). Stewart & Sunstein,
Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HA4v. L. Rav. 1193, 1302 (1982).
19. See infra notes 149-61 and accompanying text. See also Pillai, Negative Implication: The
Demise of PrivateRights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1978); Note,
Implied Private Rights of Action and Section 1983: Congressional Intent Through a Glass
Darkly, 23 B.C.L. REv. 1439 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, CongressionalIntent]; Note,
The Implication of a Private Right of Action Against Coercion Under the Federal Employers
Liability Act, 32 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 992 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implication of
a Private Right].
20. Greene, supra note 1, at 298.
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strong inclination to restrict their scope directly. 2' Accordingly, the federal
courts will confront more hybrid cases, but one may anticipate that they
will draw the jurisdictional lines so as to entertain fewer of them.
Because the courts are restricted from transforming hybrid cases into pure
federal cases by implying elements of federal law, the courts must confront
directly whether to exercise jurisdiction over both kinds of hybrid cases.
Under the traditional theory, very few of the cases like Moore, with a statecreated claim for relief, were maintained in federal court. However, the.
traditional theory rested on the assumption that some such cases could be
maintained if the federal standard were important enough. Under the traditional theory, cases like Jackson Transit, in which Congress uses a private
legal mechanism to insert federal norms into the system, did generally qualify
22
for federal jurisdiction, although the decisions contain little analysis.
In several statements in opinions touching on issues of federal question
jurisdiction, some Justices have recently suggested a new theoretical approach
to dealing with these cases, and at least one court of appeals has picked up
this approach and made it the -basis for a troubling decision. 23 The new
analysis borrows heavily from the Court's most successful business-restricting
mechanism-the extremely tight-fisted approach to implied private rights of
action 2 -and proposes to answer the jurisdiction question by searching for
congressional intent to create federal law or to exercise federal jurisdiction
in each case. The problem with this new approach is that, like the traditional
theory, it does not attempt to put the area in order based on a principled
analysis of the structural elements of a case.
This article shows how traditional jurisdiction theory allows the exercise
of federal jurisdiction over certain hybrid cases that neither the language
nor the policy of the governing jurisdictional statutes would support. The
article further shows how the Supreme Court rulings reducing the implication
of private rights of action under federal law have undercut any remaining
vitality of the overinclusive traditional standard. However, the article rebuts
the suggestion that the courts should replace the traditional analysis with
the procedures created to determine whether to imply a private action from
a federal statute; i.e., by searching for congressional intent to create federal
jurisdiction in each substantive statutory enactment. Finally, the article sug-

21. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983); Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976);
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); cf., Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
647 F.2d 320 (1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
22. Norfolk & W. R.R. Co. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37 (1971); Machinists v. Central Airlines,
372 U.S. 682 (1963); American Surety Co. v. Shulz, 237 U.S. 159 (1915).
23. See infra notes 184-215 and accompanying text.
24. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 731 (Powell, J., dissenting); Zeffiro
First Pa. Bank, 623 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1005 (1982). See infra

notes 174-252 and accompanying text.
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gests that, instead of trying to force jurisdiction questions into the implied
action mold, the courts may make sensible judgments about both what is
necessary and what is sufficient to support federal jurisdiction by returning
to the standard, set forth by Justice Holmes seventy-five years ago, of "the
law that creates the cause of action."

I.

THE BACKGROUND

In order to understand how the traditional theory evolved to its unsatisfactory state, it is necessary to examine the history of federal question
jurisdiction. This section of the article focuses particularly on the cases
involving the inevitable admixture of state and federal law and shows the
persistence of inconsistent lines of precedent, which maintain the possibility
of a broad exercise of jurisdiction, although courts have generally refused
to apply it in particular cases. This section also sets forth the present Supreme
Court's severe restriction of private actions implied from federal statutes
and shows how this latter development greatly accelerated the need for a
new jurisdictional theory.
The primary authority for all federal court jurisdiction is, of course, article
III of the Constitution. Article III, section 2 provides: "The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority .... -25
In a pair of early cases involving the Bank of the United States, the
Supreme Court confronted the scope of article 111.26 In Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, a statute creating the Bank of the United States and
defining its various powers provided affirmatively that the Bank could sue
or be sued in the United States courts. 27 The Bank of the United States sued
Ohio in federal court to stop the state from levying a tax on it, and the
Ohio defendants contended that the Bank Act extended the power of the
federal courts beyond the limits of article 111.28 In the companion case, Bank
of the United States v. Planters' Bank,29 the federal Bank sued a Georgia
bank for payment on promissory notes the Georgia bank had issued, and
defendant made the same jurisdictional contentions. 0
The substantive opinion on jurisdiction appears in Osborn. There, the
Court ruled that the judicial power of the federal courts under article III

25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
26. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Bank of the
United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
27. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 817 (1824).
28. Id. at 759.
29. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
30. Id. at 905.
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was coextensive with the legislative powers of article I." Accordingly, the

Court concluded, for the exercise of federal judicial power, article III simply
required the presence of a federal question in the case.3 2 The federal question

in Osborn, the Court continued, was amply presented by the Bank's assertion,
as a part of its claim, of its powers to sue or be sued under its federal

statutory charter of incorporation."a

In deciding that the Bank's charter of incorporation was a sufficient federal

element, Justice Marshall rejected several related arguments that have continued to trouble commentators and judges to the present day. He rejected

the contentions that the federal source of the Bank's existence was too
remote from the actual dispute between the parties 3 4 that the bank charter
was not likely to be controverted, 5 and finally, therefore, that the real
36
dispute would likely be over propositions of state law.

The Court thus held that any federal element which, if controverted, could
defeat plaintiff's claim, sufficed to qualify the case as one "arising under"
article III. Any other ruling, the Court held, would exclude cases based on

37
speculation as to defendant's tactical decision regarding what to contest.
Moreover, requiring that the federal claim be the determinative one would

exclude almost all cases, because there is almost no case of pure federal

law.3"
The Bank's substantive case in Osborn was one for an injunction against
the enforcement of Ohio law taxing the Bank on the grounds that it violated

the U.S. Constitution.3 9 Article III would clearly provide authority for the
Bank to bring that suit. 40 Planters' Bank presented a purer jurisdictional
problem than Osborn did, because Planters' Bank was a state law contract

case. However, the Court drew no distinction between Planters' Bank and
Osborn and simply rejected the defendant's constitutional attack on the
Bank's jurisdictional statute in Planters' Bank on the strength of its opinion

31. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 821.
32. Id. at 822.
33. Id. at 823-24.
34. Id. at 824-25.
35. Id. at 826-28.
36. Id. at 854-55.
37. Id. at 857.
38. Id. at 858. Justice Marshall may have been exaggerating. He saw potential non-federal
issues as, for example, "whether the conduct of the plaintiff has been such as to entitle him
to maintain his action; whether his right is barred; whether he has received satisfaction, or has
in any manner released his claims." Id. at 820.
The Supreme Court has held since Osborn that where such questions are sufficiently close
to the effectuation of a federal statute, they are governed by federal common law. See infra
notes 259-75 and accompanying text.
39. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 866-70.
40. "The Judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority." U.S. CoNrs. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
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in Osborn.41Accordingly, Congress' extension of article III jurisdiction cannot be explained away as arising under the Constitution, like Osborn. Jurisdiction over the U.S. Bank's contract claim against the Georgia bank can
rest only on Justice Marshall's expansive analysis that the federal courts
may exercise jurisdiction over the case under article III because the Bank's
power to sue originated in a federal charter.
While probably reaching the right result in Osborn by exercising federal
jurisdiction, the Court's opinion generated an immediate floodgate response. 42 Beginning with Justice Johnson's dissent, commentators and judges
envisioned floods of federal litigation involving every relationship of every
entity whose existence was attributable to a federal act, 43 or in which an
overheated imagination could conjure up a possible federal dispute."
Since Osborn was based on a specific provision in the Bank Act, which
the Court read as jurisdictional, the courts did not confront its full implications until fifty years later when Congress passed the first statute creating
general federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts. 45 The Act reproduced verbatim the operative language of article 111.46
There is respectable scholarly work to the effect that Congress did not
intend to vary the meaning of the constitutional language, which survives
essentially unchanged as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 today. 47 Nonetheless, beginning

41. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. at 905.
42. There is a school of thought that the Court need not have decided Osborn on federal
question grounds; rather, that article III authorized Congress to create "protective jurisdiction"
to protect federal interest in the Bank. See, e.g., Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 542, 547 (1983).
43. Osborn, 22 U.S. at §74-76 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
44. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 32, at 547-50; Mishkin, supra note 5, at 187-88.
45. Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
46. The language read:
[T]he circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance . . . of
all suits . . . where the matter in dispute exceeds . . . five hundred dollars, and
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority, or in which the United States are
plaintiffs or petitioners, or in which there shall be a controversy . . . between
citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, or a
controversy between citizens of a State and foreign states, citizens, or subjects;
and shall have exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offenses cognizable under
the authority of the United States ....
Id.
47. See supra note 3.
Professor Forrester has traced the evolution of the 1875 Act and concluded that "by repeating
the words of the Constitution the Congress intended that the statutory words should have the
same interpretation and meaning as the words in the Constitution." Forrester, FederalQuestion
Jurisdiction and Section 5, 18 TUL. L. REV. 263, 265 (1943).
Professors Chadbourn and Levin, however, have argued that section 5 of the Act of 1875
provided relief from the expansive construction of the language of section 1. Chadbourn &
Levin, OriginalJurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. RaV. 639, 649-50 (1942).
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with Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 4 where the Court refused to

exercise federal jurisdiction over enforcement of a mining title derived from
the United States, the courts have construed the
statute substantially more
49

narrowly than they have construed article III.

From the time Justice Johnson dissented in Osborn to the present, the

key unacceptable aspect of Osborn has been the remoteness of the federal
element from the dispute.5 0 Indeed, it is a long distance from a federal statute

incorporating an entity to suits over that entity's every contract or other
act. 5' Of course, remoteness also implicates the other concerns motivating
Justice Johnson's dissent: doubt that the federal element will be disputed

and thus will require resolution, and the prospect that plaintiff, therefore,
can prevail without invoking the federal element.
Accordingly, after distinguishing Osborn as a constitutional decision, the
courts have attempted to establish tests for proximity of federal law to the
dispute in order to define the scope of the general jurisdictional statute. It

was this effort that led to the theoretical quagmire into which so many have
5 2

disappeared.

48. 96 U.S. 199 (1878). The Court in Gold-Washing did not articulate its reasons very
satisfactorily. The case arose when the plaintiff sued defendant in state court for nuisance
because defendant's mining operations were polluting waters running onto his farmland. Defendant removed, claiming that it owned the lands pursuant to title derived from federal law
and that its right under that title to operate in the offending fashion derived from the provisions
of federal statute establishing the title. Id. at 202-03. The Court held that defendant had not
presented facts sufficient to show that its claim "necessarily depends upon the construction of
the statutes." Id. at 203. Apparently, the Court was saying that the intervening title caused
the statute to be too remote from the dispute to support jurisdiction unless the petitioner could
show that a statutory, rather than a title-created, right was at issue. This is clearly a narrowing
of the holding in Planters' Bank.
49. See FRANKFORTER & LANDIS, THE BusINEss oF THE SUPREME COURT 65, 69 (1928);
Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 47; Forrester, supra note 47, at 280-86.
50. Justice Frankfurter expressed its unacceptability as follows:
[W]e would not be justified in perpetuating a principle that permits assertion of
original federal jurisdiction on the remote possibility of presentation of a federal
question. Indeed, Congress, by largely withdrawing the jurisdiction that the Pacific
R[ailroad] Removal Cases recognized, and this Court, by refusing to perpetuate
it under general grants of jurisdiction, have already done much to recognize the
changed atmosphere.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 482 (1957) (citation omitted).
51. As Justice Cardozo expressed it, in finding against jurisdiction in a case involving a
federal defense:
[C]ountless claims of right can be discovered to have their source or their operative
limits in the provisions of a federal statute or in the Constitution itself with its
circumambient restrictions upon legislative power. To set bounds to the pursuit,
the courts have formulated the distinction between ... disputes that are necessary
and those that are merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that
compass by.
Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 118 (1936). See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying
text.
52. See sources cited supra note 8. Professor Currie summarizes the intransigent nature
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Two restrictions on statutory federal question jurisdiction have evolved.
The one of least interest to this inquiry is the "well-pleaded complaint" rule
set forth in Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley1 3 There, the Court
refused to find jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claim that their free railroad
passes were allowable under the federal Interstate Commerce Act. The Court
characterized the plaintiffs' "claim" as merely one for enforcement of its
agreement with the railroad.5 4 Finding that whether federal law allowed the
railroad to contract entered the case solely as a defense, the Court held that,
under the statute, 55 federal "arising under" jurisdiction could rest only on
the well-pleaded elements of plaintiff's complaint and not on an anticipation
of defendant's federal defense under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Although there are good policy reasons for the exercise of federal removal
jurisdiction when the defense poses a real federal issue,5 6 they have not been
accepted by the federal courts. Under the present statutory and case law,
the court must eliminate extraneous matter from the complaint and determine
whether the remaining elements of plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint meet
57
the test for federal jurisdiction.
The well-pleaded complaint rule does not address the limits of jurisdiction
where federal law supplies some, but not all, elements of the plaintiff's
affirmative claim, and it is this second restriction on federal question jurisdiction to which this article will now turn. The line of cases addressing this
problem originates in Justice Holmes' opinion in American Well Works v.
Layne & Bowler Co.58 American Well Works was an action for trade libel,
a creature of Arkansas common law.5 9 Plaintiff began its suit in Arkansas
state court, claiming that defendants had libelled it by asserting that plaintiff
was infringing defendants' patent and by threatening to sue plaintiff's customersA6 Defendants removed, contending that plaintiff's case involved a
question of federal patent law, because, if defendants' statements regarding

of the problem under the traditional theory with particular brevity and eloquence. See Currie,
supra note 4, at 276-77.

53.

211 U.S. 149 (1908).

54. Id. at 152.
55. Id.
56. Cohen, supra note 5, at 895; Currie, supra note 8, at 270; Field, supra note 5, at 689;
Hornstein, supra note 8, at 605.
57. In her recent overview of federal jurisdiction, Professor Field suggests that the wellpleaded complaint rule means that the test for federal jurisdiction must be broader than the
test set forth, infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text, requiring a federal cause of action.
This is so, because, as Field expressed it, "the cause of action under which a suit is brought
is always properly part of the complaint; accordingly, if the cause of action had to be federal,
the well-pleaded complaint rule would be superfluous." Field, supra note 8, at 689. Field is
correct. To the extent that the well-pleaded complaint rule continues to play a role in jurisdictional decisionmaking, it reflects the survival of the open-ended traditional theory.
58. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
59. Id. at 258-59.
60. Id.
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plaintiff's infringements were true, plaintiff would lose.61 The Supreme Court
62
ruled that the case should have been remanded back to state court.
In so ruling, Justice Holmes opined that "[w]hat makes defendants' act
a wrong is its manifest tendency to injure the plaintiff's business ....
[W]hether it is a wrong or not depends on the law of the state where the
act is done, not upon the patent law .... A suit arises under the law that
creates the cause of action." 63
The actual ruling in American Well Works is a rather narrow one; under
the facts, a trade-libel plaintiff need not plead and prove that the defendant's
statement was false; rather, defendant's truth is a defense. Accordingly, the
federal patent law question arguably enters the case as a defense, and the
64
decision may thus rest on the well-pleaded complaint rule set forth above.
However, the opinion is a much broader one, and the federal cause of action
65
concept warrants further attention.
Holmes' simple formulation was substantially weakened by the Court's
ruling in the next major jurisdictional case, Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co. 66 Smith presented the not-uncommon situation of a state taking
a federal legal concept and giving it force and effect in the state system.
The Smith plaintiff alleged that the United States Constitution prohibited
Congress from legislating the issuance of federal farm loan bonds.6 7 Under
Missouri law, a local bank may only invest in, inter alia, legal obligations
of the United States.68 A Missouri shareholder sued to enforce this Missouri
prohibition on the bank directors, seeking to prevent them from investing
in the bonds.69 Over Holmes' vigorous dissent, the Supreme Court sustained
federal jurisdiction. Holmes said:
But it seems to me that a suit cannot be said to arise under any other
law than that which creates the cause of action. It may be enough that
the law relied upon creates a part of the cause of action, although not
the whole, as held in Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738,
819-823, which, perhaps, is all that is meant by the less guarded expressions in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 379. I am content to assume
this to be so, although the Osborn Case has been criticized and regretted.
But the law must create at least a part of the cause of action by its own
force, for it is the suit, not a question in the suit, that must arise under
the law of the United States. The mere adoption by a state law of a
United States law as a criterion or test, when the law of the United

61. Id. at 259-60.
62. Id. at 260.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
65. Cohen, supra note 5, at 897; Field, supra note 5, at 687; Note, supra note 8, at 982.
See infra text accompanying note 312.
66. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
67. Id. at 198.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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States has no force proprio vigore, does not cause a case under the state
law to be also a case under the law of the United States, and so it has
been decided by this court again and again.1°
Much of the rest of academic and judicial writing on the subject of arising
under jurisdiction has been an unsuccessful attempt to integrate Smith and
American Well Works.
One way to attempt integration is to treat Smith as a sport. Several cases
involving widely varying fact situations and "direct" and "disputed" federal
claims similar to Smith have come to the Supreme Court, but, as the
discussion of the decisions since Smith will illustrate, the Court has never
7
directly ruled the same way again. 1
The Court had its first opportunity to apply the Smith analysis in Pan
American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court.72 There, the plaintiff sought
to enforce a contract for gas that provided for a refund of all rates paid
above the rate filed with the Federal Power Commission. The defendant
sought a ruling that the action "arose under" the federal Natural Gas Act
enforceable exclusively in federal court. The Supreme Court rejected the
contention. Equating the jurisdictional provisions of the Natural Gas Act
with the general "arising under" jurisdiction of the federal courts, Justice
Frankfurter ruled for a unanimous Court that "the suits are thus based
upon claims of right arising under state, not federal law. ' 73
The Court's clearest pronouncement on the Smith approach to jurisdiction
appears in Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway.74 There, a plaintiff sought
to enforce the Kentucky Employers' Liability Act. The Kentucky act defined
the employer's liability to include violation of the safety standards set forth
in a federal employee safety law, the Federal Safety Appliance Act. 75 Although brought as a diversity suit, the litigation gave rise to a venue question
that caused the Court to confront whether the action also "arose under"
the FSAA. The Court held that it did not:
Questions arising in actions in state courts to recover for injuries sustained
by employees in intrastate commerce and relating to the scope or construction of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts are, of course, federal
questions which may appropriately be reviewed in this Court. But it does

70. Id. at 214-15 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. See Flournoy v. Weiner, 321 U.S. 253 (1944). When the Supreme Court had occasion
recently to restate the general principles underlying federal question jurisdiction, it reiterated
the holding in Smith: "We have often held that a case 'arose under' federal law where the
vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law."
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1983).
However, despite the Court's assertion, it could come up with only one other authority for
the continued validity of Smith, Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 480 (1917). Hopkins, of course,
predates Smith by four years.
72. 366 U.S. 656 (1961).
73. Id. at 663.
74. 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
75. Id. at 212.
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not follow that a suit brought under the state statute which defines
liability to employees -who are injured while engaged in intrastate commerce, and brings within the purview of the statute a breach of the duty
imposed by the federal statute, should be regarded as a suit arising under
the laws of the United States and cognizable in the federal court in the
absence of diversity of citizenship. The Federal Safety Appliance Acts,
while prescribing absolute duties, and thus creating correlative rights in
favor of injured employees, did not attempt to lay down rules governing

actions for enforcing these rights.7

Technically, Moore also fails to meet the well-pleaded complaint test, because, under Kentucky law, the federal law supplied not an element of
plaintiff's claim, but negated certain of defendant's defenses." However, as
one commentator has pointed out "although Moore is sustainable on this
narrow ground, the opinion makes nothing of the point. ' 71
The plaintiff in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 79 tried to get
around the problem by casting its action in terms of a declaratory judgment.
The litigants were parties to a contract conditioned on the Federal Power
Commission issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The
F.P.C. issued a certificate, but it was conditional. Defendant then notified
plaintiff that it was excused from its obligations under the contract, because
it lacked the necessary certification. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district
court for a declaratory judgment that the F.P.C. had issued such a certificate
as contemplated by the federal act and by the contract.
The Supreme Court held that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction. It held, first, that the availability of a declaratory judgment action
could not expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.80
Accordingly, the Court held, it would have to examine whether the plaintiff's
coercive action-for enforcement of contract-arose under federal law. The
Court then held that an action to enforce a contract that became effective
only if federal law were satisfied did not arise under federal law. 8' The Court
went on to conclude that the plaintiff's contention actually arose not as a
part of its affirmative contract claim, but as a reply to defendant's defense
of a failure to comply with a condition subsequent in the contract.8 2 However
the opinion in Skelly, like Moore, is broader than this;8 3 moreover, Pan

76. Id. at 214-15 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 212-13.
78. Greene, supra note 1, at 324 n.147.
79. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
80. Id. at 673-74.
81. Id.at 678.
82. Id.at 672.
83. The Skelly Court said: "If Phillips sought damages from petitioners or specific performance of their contracts, it could not bring suit in the United States District Court on the
theory that it was asserting a federal right. And for the simple reason that such a suit would
'arise' under the State law governing the contracts." Id. at 672.
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American is just the plaintiff's coercive action contemplated in Skelly, and
it, too, failed to meet the standards for federal jurisdiction.
One source in support of Smith's continued validity is Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in Flournoy v. Wiener.84 Flournoy was a brief opinion dismissing a
direct appeal from a Louisiana Supreme Court decision voiding a state tax
law. 5 Since the state tax law incorporated and relied upon the federal tax
law for the disputed provision, Justice Frankfurter viewed the lower court
decision as raising a federal question suitable for Supreme Court review.
In disputing the Court's conclusion that "[i]t is not the federal but the
state statute which imposes the tax on appellees, ' ' s6 Justice Frankfurter relied
upon Smith and Standard Oil v. Johnson.8 7 Because Flournoy is a case about
the scope of Supreme Court review of a federal question in a state court
decision, Justice Frankfurter correctly invokes Smith. Although the distinctions between Supreme Court review and original federal question jurisdiction
are not entirely clear, as set forth below, Supreme Court appellate review
of federal legal questions in state court decisions under article III, at issue
in Flournoy, can extend well beyond the original "arising under" jurisdiction
of the federal courts in Smith. 8 Thus, if a state statute incorporating a
reference to legality under federal law were grounds for federal question
jurisdiction based on Smith, a fortiori, the majority in Flournoy is wrong.
Rather than proving the continued validity of Smith, as Justice Frankfurter
asserts, the result in Flournoy emphasizes Smith's isolation.
Regarding Standard Oil, Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion elides
the fundamental point: Standard Oil was not an original federal question
case, but a petition for certiorari from the California Supreme Court. 9 In
Standard Oil the California tax law exempted "federal installations" from
state taxation. 9° Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court was deciding not
whether the plaintiff's case arose under federal law, but rather whether the
state court's interpretation of the phrase "federal installation" in the state

Accordingly, the opinion in Skelly must be read to mean that a state-created contract
action that depends on a federal standard of behavior would not satisfy section 1331.
84. 321 U.S. 253, 263 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting). Justices Roberts and Jackson
joined the dissent.
Although at least one commentator has cited Frankfurter's Flournoy dissent as authority
for the continued validity of Smith (see Note, supra note 8, at 1002-03), as set forth in the
text, Justice Frankfurter's opinion actually demonstrates Smith's disavowal.
See also Justice Brennan's recent decision for the Court in Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S.Ct. 2841 (1983), discussed infra notes 312-28 and accompanying
text.
85. Flournoy, 321 U.S. at 254.
86. Id. at 260.
87. 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
88. See infra notes 312-43 and accompanying text.
89. Standard Oil, 316 U.S. at 483.
90. Id. at 482.
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9
statute was a federal decision or one resting on independent state grounds. '

Thus, like Flournoy, Standard Oil is an interpretation of the more liberal
standards of article III.
Accordingly, if the expansive federal question analysis of Smith were right,
the decision in Standard Oil would a fortiori be correct. More importantly,
however, Standard Oil can stand without Smith. Despite Justice Frankfurter's
canny drafting in Flournoy, suggesting that the Standard Oil Court applied

the reasoning of Smith, 92 Smith is nowhere mentioned in Standard Oil.
As this review reflects, cases involving a mixture of state and federal law
have always made it very difficult for the courts to decide when a case is
federal enough to be said to "arise under" federal law. The almost simultaneous decisions in Smith and American Well Works set up a situation
where two incompatible approaches to the problem enjoyed equal precedential status. The actual decisions following Smith and American Well
Works adhered to the more restrictive standard of American Well Works.

However, occasional opinions reiterating in a talismanic way Smith's validity
perpetuated the analytic confusion and allowed the Court to avoid confronting how the Smith approach is fundamentally incompatible with other

federalism concerns.
Academic commentators have not been any more successful than the Court

in integrating Smith. In his seminal article on federal question jurisdiction,
Professor Mishkin essentially ducks the question of how Smith fits into any

principled theory of federal question jurisdiction. After setting forth his
standard-that plaintiff's claim "must be founded 'directly' upon national
law" 9 3 -he addresses Smith in the most indirect way:
Under this criterion, a demand for judicial relief allegedly authorized by
local law will be insufficient, even though that rule depends for its vitality
upon explicit authorization by, or incorporation into, national law. For
example, a state tax claim against a national bank, which could be valid
only if it qualified for the explicit Congressional waiver of immunity,
would nonetheless have to be litigated initially in a state court. State law
created the cause of action. Per contra, where federal law has inserted
itself into the texture of state law, a claim founded on the national
legislation could be brought into a federal forum. Thus, if Congress
declared certain bonds, which it had authorized and wished to promote,
to be permissible investments for all fiduciaries, an action by a trustee
for a judgment declaring that his purchase of those securities is legal
would be founded "directly" upon the national law. And this would be
so despite the fact that without state-imposed limits on fiduciary in9
vestments, the problem would not exist. 4

91. Id. at 483.
92. Of Standard Oil, Justice Frankfurter wrote: "We unanimously applied the reasoning
of [Smith]." Flournoy, 321 U.S. at 271-72.
93. Mishkin, supra note 5, at 165.
94. Id. at 165-66.
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Mishkin's sole authority for this statement is to "Cf. Smith. " 95 Since Smith
is an injunction suit to prohibit violation of the Missouri limits on fiduciaries
and not a suit for a declaratory judgment under a preemptive federal statute,
Mishkin's reference is unclear. He does not attempt to reconcile Smith with
his formulation for jurisdiction-that federal law must "establish [plaintiff's]
substantive right to a remedy. ' ' 96 Moreover, in discussing Skelly a few pages
later, he sets forth another standard difficult to reconcile with Smith:
It seems clear that the only significance of national law was that the
parties to a local contract had chosen to limit the power of termination
by the occurrence of an event authorized by that law. It was state law
under which the contract was made and would be enforced, and which
permitted the selection of an event-presumably almost any event-as the
measure of the consensually arrived at power of termination."
Similarly, in Smith, the significance of the national law was that "the
[Missouri legislature] had chosen to limit the power of [investment] by the
'98
occurrence of an event authorized by the law."
Writing some years later, Professor Cohen was more forthright, essentially
acknowledging that Smith is objectively irreconcilable with both American
Well Works and the cases decided after Smith.99 Cohen correctly concluded
that Smith required a test for jurisdiction much more liberal than Holmes
would have required. In response, Cohen argued that the Holmes standard
was too narrow.'00 Cohen's problem was that he could not discern any
standard which would allow the federal courts to entertain Smith, without
opening the floodgates to other cases, many of which the courts had already
turned away. 10'
Cohen's ultimate solution is a real tribute to the federal judiciary. Unwilling to relinquish Smith and unable to articulate an objective standard
of federal jurisdiction to define the cases he wishes to include, he proposed
what he calls a "pragmatic" solution to allow the exercise of jurisdiction
over cases lawyers feel intuitively to be federal:
A novel claim of mixed federal and state law ought to qualify as "arising
under" federal law only if it exhibits those features which justify the
need for federal trial court jurisdiction of federal question cases. A case
that requires expertise in the construction of the federal law involved in
the case, and a sympathetic forum for the trial of factual issues'related
to the existence of a claimed federal right, ought to fall within federal
jurisdiction. On the other hand, a federal court should not be compelled

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.at 166.
Id.at 165.
Id.at 183.
Id.at 166.
Cohen, supra note 5, at 898.
Id.at 903.
Id.at 906-07.
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to accept federal question jurisdiction over a class of suits which typically
neither involves actual contested issues of federal law nor requires the
protective jurisdiction of a sympathetic federal trial forum.12
Applying his own test, he finds the existing cases to be properly decided;
more important, he predicts that use of his pragmatic factors will lead to
certainty in deciding future cases.10 3 The American Law Institute, writing
two years later, found no such certainty.' 4 All they were able to propose
was to leave the basic arising under language intact, to "preserve the existing
body of law."'' 0
The Outer Limits of Arising Under, a law student note, is the most recent
comprehensive look at the area.' °0 Like the ALI study, Outer Limits does
not discuss whether Cohen's pragmatic test worked to predict the Court's
behavior in the years since 1967 or to protect the federalism values Cohen
articulated. OuterLimits rejects Cohen's position because a "vague, intuitive
'federal interests' test is an escape, not an answer."'' 0 7 As it further points
out, the operative jurisdictional statutes do not speak in terms of pragmatic
need, but of objective factors. Based on these overarching concerns, Outer
Limits correctly expresses the need for a reliable standard or set of standards.
Outer Limits proposes what it calls a "principled" alternative to the
existing amorphous jurisdictional tests. It would reduce the requirement for
federal jurisdiction to a federal element in the case that is "substantial."' ' 0
To determine substantiality, the note writer proposes that, in each case, one
must ask whether the federal proposition is "logically central" to the dispute
and thus likely to enter into the actual controversy at trial in some way.' 0 9
Since this formula is not exactly unambiguous, the writer proffers an example
of the proposed theory in action-a malicious prosecution action, Sweeney
v. Abramovitz."'0 In Sweeney, a plaintiff sued a policeman for breach of
the federal Civil Rights Act."' After the federal plaintiff lost, the policeman
sued the plaintiff under state malicious prosecution law. The state defendant
' 2
removed, and plaintiff's remand was denied.
In a short opinion by the very able district judge,' the court resurrected
Smith and held that "a proposition of federal law is a pivotal ingredient of

102. Id.at 906.
103. Id.at 908.
104. ALI STUDY, supra note 4.
105. Id.at 69-74.
106. Note, supra note 8.
107. Id.at 980.
108. Id.at 1004.
109. Id.at 1005.
110. 449 F. Supp. 213, 214 (D. Conn. 1978).
111. Id.
112. Id.at 214-16.
113. Then District Judge Newman now sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.
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plaintiff's claim." ' "' The Outer Limits note argues that Sweeney's allegation
of lack of probable cause to believe in a section 1983 claim shows that a
federal proposition-what facts might a civil rights plaintiff reasonably believe
constitute a violation of section 1983-will probably be central to the state
5
plaintiff's claim."
The problem with Outer Limits is that it simply proves too much. Although
the Sweeney example is an appealling one, a federal question is equally
logically central to every action where a state statute, constitution, or common law claim incorporates reference to a federal standard.
The district judge cites no persuasive authority for his ruling,"16 and the
opinion clearly reflects his outcome orientation:
If the question of what constitutes probable cause to bring a § 1983
action is determined according to state law, there is a possibility that the
standard will be set so high in some state courts as to permit malicious
prosecution suits to be brought in response to legitimate § 1983 actions.
It is of course possible that § 1983 actions, like any other judicial process,
may be abused. But determining the standards for a malicious prosecution
action requires the delicate balancing of the legitimate interests of public
officials to be free from unfounded § 1983 suits against the necessity of
preserving plaintiffs' ability to vindicate their federal rights undeterred
by fear of being subjected to unfounded malicious prosecution suits.
Such a balancing may
itself be a federal question sufficient to invoke §
7
1331 jurisdiction.1
Surely, such problems ought to be considered by Congress, for instance, as
a problem of federal protective jurisdiction and not allowed to unbalance
the structure of federal question jurisdiction." 8
Thus, the academic commentators, in their concern for having the words
of a federal statute construed by a sympathetic federal judiciary, failed to

114. Sweeney, 449 F. Supp. at 214-16 (quoting McFaddin Express, Inc. v. Adley Corp.,
346 F.2d 424, 426 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966)).
115. Note, supra note 8, at 1006.
116. Judge Newman cites to several Second Circuit cases, none of which actually found
jurisdiction based on Smith: Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486
(2d Cir. 1968); McFaddin Express, Inc. v. Adley Corp., 346 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966); T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 915 (1965). In Harms and McFaddin, the court found no jurisdiction. In Ivy,
jurisdiction was based on a finding that the plaintiff was enforcing federal common law.
The court's only other authority is a series of declaratory judgment cases to declare the
rights of parties under federal patent law. As set forth in the text infra at notes 308-11, both
the facts of these cases and the unique role of the declaratory procedure essentially isolates
them from the rest of the body of jurisdictional law.
117. Sweeney, 449 F. Supp. at 216.
118. Congress has already provided separately for an analogous kind of jurisdiction by
allowing removal of cases against persons who cannot vindicate their "equal civil rights." 28
U.S.C. § 1443 (1982). Judge Newman properly found that section 1983 did not qualify as an
equal rights law for the purposes of section 1443 under the facts in Sweeney. Id. at 214. That
Congress had already addressed a piece of the problem presented by Sweeney in an explicit
jurisdictional statute should have made the Court extremely reluctant to find the issue covered
by section 1331.
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see how such an open-ended standard would produce the unacceptable result
of allowing state law to catapult otherwise unqualified plaintiffs into the
federal courts.
Although traditional federal question analysis failed to produce a principled basis for understanding or predicting the area, for a long time the
question lay largely dormant. Hybrid cases were not numerous," 9 nor, when
they occurred, was their disposition perceived as threatening to the substantive federalism interests involved. This was so, because the jurisdictional
problem of when a litigant may bring to federal court a claim drawing on
state, as well as federal, law does not arise if federal courts will imply from
20
an incomplete federal statute the elements of a claim not explicitly supplied.
Some courts, however, did anticipate the problem as it ultimately developed.' 2' For example, as set forth above, the federal statute in Moore
established a federal standard for railroad safety but provided explicitly for
enforcement only by interstate employees.12 2 One avenue to federal jurisdiction in Moore was to imply a claim for intrastate employees from the Act.
However, in Moore, the Supreme Court refused to do SO,' 23 and in so ruling
the Court walked away from an earlier decision, Texas v. Rigsby,' 24 which
25
had implied a federal case in the FSAA claim of an intrastate employee.'
The issue surfaced most graphically in the Supreme Court opinion, and
Justice Brennan's dissent, in Wheeldin v. Wheeler.' 26 The plaintiff there
claimed that he had been damaged by defendant's service on him of a
subpoena to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee.
According to plaintiff's complaint, the defendant, an investigator for HUAC,
had obtained signed, blank subpoenas without committee authorization and
had served him, resulting in the loss of his job.' 27 Plaintiff claimed Wheeler
lacked authority to subpoena him and also attacked the constitutionality of
Congress' authorization to the Committee to do so. By the time the case
reached the Supreme Court only plaintiff's claim for money damages re28
mained.

119. Greene, supra note 1, at 322.
120. The implication of a private enforcement remedy for a federal statutory standard
avoids the problem of which court has jurisdiction of the Moore type of hybrid, where, absent
implication, only state law could supply the remedy. It also avoids the problem of whether a
federal court has jurisdiction when Congress uses a private mechanism for imposing federal
norms as in Jackson Transit by ignoring Congress' remedial mechanism and creating an
independent federal remedy by implication.
121. Cohen, supra note 5, at 911; Greene, supra note 1, at 297.
122. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
123. Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 215 (1934).
124. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
125. Moore, 291 U.S. at 215 n.6.
126. 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
127. Id. at 648.
128. Id. at 648-49.
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In the majority opinion, Justice Douglas treated the plaintiff's constitutional claim on the merits, finding federal jurisdiction over the claim in the
briefest paragraph.1 29 On the merits, he ruled that the service of the subpoena
simply did not amount to an unreasonable search or seizure.' 30
Justice Douglas then addressed plaintiff's claims for damages for defendant's failure to comply with the federal statute authorizing HUAC to issue
subpoenas. First, he addressed plaintiff's request that the Court create a
federal common law action on his behalf. There, he simply relied on the
generally tight-fisted approach the Court had taken to creating federal common law' 3' and denied the request.
On the proposal to imply an action for abuse from the statute authorizing
subpoenas, Justice Douglas presented several arguments supporting denial.
First, he distinguished federal statutes that created an affirmative duty, as
in the duty of fair representation cases,' 32 from the subpoena statute, which
merely grants authority to act, concluding that implication of actions to
enforce affirmative duties does not support implication of a damage action
33
for conduct beyond the statutory grant.'
Justice Douglas noted that suits for damages against federal officers for
abuse of power were generally governed by local substantive law, with the
federal permission entering only as the agents' defense. Finally, he anticipated
future developments by noting that Congress had considered the problem
of actions against federal officers acting under color of law and had not
provided for such an express action. 4 Under the circumstances, he con35
cluded, "It is not for us to fill any hiatus Congress has left in this area."'
Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black, dissented. The dissent is almost a catalogue of all the hybrid possibilities inherent
in the case. Thus, because the majority opinion is exceedingly cursory and
because it implicitly rejects all of Justice Brennan's arguments, the opinion
indicates an early inclination toward the Court's present conservative approach. On the other hand, as is set forth below,' 36 Wheeldin was in some

129. Id. at 649.
130. Id. at 649-50.
131. Justice Douglas relied on Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352
U.S. 29 (1956) (no federal common law for determining good faith purchases of federal paper).
Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 651.
132. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
In the duty of fair representation cases, the Court had established a private action for
employees against their unions derived from the federal statutory right of exclusive union
representation. See infra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
133. Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 651.
134. Id. at 652.
135. Id. at 657.
136. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
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sense an isolated decision, since the Supreme Court thereafter embarked on
fourteen years of generosity, at least toward implied private actions for
enforcement of federal statutes.
Justice Brennan brushed aside the fourth amendment claims. Instead, he
characterized the complaint as "the notion of a tort of malicious abuse of
federal process by a federal officer."' 3 7 The tort, Brennan admitted, was a
claim only actionable under state common law where the operative acts
occurred. Therefore, Justice Brennan first suggested that the tort claim might
be entertained as a simple state claim pendent to plaintiff's
nonfrivolous
38
claim for violation of his fourth amendment rights.
Second, Justice Brennan suggested that plaintiff's state law tort claim
might be entertained as a Smith claim incorporating an inherent federal
right, i.e., the classic hybrid case. 39 Noting the scholarly suggestion that
Smith was a sterile detour, he reiterated its continuing validity, distinguishing
40
ensuing decisions as involving remote or collateral federal issues.
Justice Brennan next proposed that the Court might imply a federal action
from the federal standards. In so proposing, he set forth the old liberal
standard for such implication:
Implied rights of action are not contingent upon statutory language which
affirmatively indicates that they are intended. On the contrary, they are
implied unless the legislation evidences a contrary intention. Increasingly,
the tendency in the federal courts has been to infer private rights of
action from federal statutes
unless to do so would defeat manifest
4
congressional purpose.' '

Finally, Brennan suggested that the Court might have formulated federal
common law to define the claims against federal officers. 42 In sum, Wheeldin
is a veritable encyclopedia of the possibilities of expanding federal subject
matter jurisdiction over hybrid cases. That six Justices rejected Brennan's
views illustrates the gap between traditional jurisdiction theory as it then
existed and the real problems the Court was beginning to face as private
enforcement of federal law heated up.
At this point, the problem was as follows. Under Justice Holmes' test of
"the law that creates the cause of action," courts and commentators feared
that cases necessitating the construction of federal standards would be excluded from federal court, creating an undesirably underinclusive jurisdictional test. However, the holding in Smith produced an overinclusive precedent
for state legislatures or even private parties to create relationships enforceable

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 660-61.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id. at 661-62 (citations omitted).
Id.at 663.
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by the federal courts in the absence of any indication that the federal
legislature intended or even desired such a result.
Courts and commentators trying to establish a responsible middle ground
between these two positions proposed that federal jurisdiction extend to suits
if they fit the court's intuition regarding the need for federal court "expertise" and "sympathy." The traditional theory thus avoided the critical exercises of defining the elements of a claim, identifying their origins in the
federal or state systems, and deciding which court system should be adjudicating the disputes based on the language of the jurisdictional authority
and the policy supporting it.
The problem did not manifest itself immediately. As set forth above,
Wheeldin and Moore were somewhat rare.143 Writing in the Harvard Law
Review in 1969, Ronald Greene could safely assert:
Notwithstanding its jurisprudential allure, Moore has not proved to
be a germinal precedent. The trend lately has been away from the creation
of hybrid state law remedies, as in Moore, and toward the development
of that purer strain, the implied federal cause of action. In the field of

air transportation, at least one district court has followed the F.S.A.A.
precedents and has remitted complainants to state law remedies, but the
Second Circuit has opted for an implied federal cause of action. In the
important field of securities regulation, the Supreme Court has held that
a federal right of action for injured private parties is to be implied under
the proxy rules authorized by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a
holding which probably applies to other private actions which have been
implied under the Act. Although it is possible that hybrid state law claims
could coexist in some of these settings with implied federal remedies,
grants of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts (especially under the
Securities Exchange Act) would cause some difficulty, and in any event
the survival of hybrid claims would be of little practical significance. A
party wishing to guarantee access to the Supreme Court could simply
sue in a federal district court on the implied federal claim, or, if a grant
of exclusive federal jurisdiction is no bar, join such a claim in a state
court action.1'

143. The issue of federal jurisdiction over hybrids did sporadically surface in the courts,
occasionally meeting its Doppelganger, the federally implied private right of action, but rarely
generating an analytical confrontation. A marvelous example of the phenomenon is a pair of
cases, McFaddin v. Adley (1), 346 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1965), and McFaddin v. Adley (II), 363
F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1965). McFaddin (I), involved actions
approved pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act. 346 F.2d at 425. In McFaddin (I), the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that plaintiff's action was but a common law
contract action not entitled to federal jurisdiction. However, the Court suggested that plaintiff
might succeed in obtaining federal jurisdiction by restating its action as one for enforcement
of the statute itself. 346 F.2d at 427. Plaintiff refiled, contending that defendant breached the
federal statute, which forbade mergers except upon the approved, contracted-for conditions.
Wrong again, the Second Circuit held, this time ruling that Congress had not intended the
statute to be enforced by private action, but only by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
363 F.2d at 546.
144. Greene, supra note 1, at 298 (emphasis added).
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For some time before and six years after Greene wrote, the federal courts
continued down this path. They enforced the federal securities laws in private
suits for damages, 45 allowed the beneficiaries of federal spending programs

to bring injunction suits to enforce the statutory limitations on grant recipients,

laws.

46

47

and implied private damage suits for breach of the federal labor

Although the Court was somewhat inarticulate, it is probably fair to say

that the judicial creation of private claims not expressed by Congress rests
on one of two possible grounds. The Court thought that, where Congress
was silent, it was free to exercise its inherent equitable powers to create

remedies for violation of legal rights. In the alternative, the Court felt it
4
was just fulfilling the unexpressed will of Congress.
The ensuing development in the law of implied private actions could be
read as a movement away from the first ground and toward the second,
coupled with an increasingly high standard for establishing legislative intent.
The Court began to limit the implication of such actions in its decision in
Cort v. Ash 149 in 1975. Beginning with Cort, the Court implied private
enforcement of federal statutes only if certain structural indicia were present

to prove that such enforcement was appropriate. Cort was a civil action for

damages for alleged violation of the federal Election Campaign Act.5 0 The
act provided explicitly for enforcement by the Justice Department and the
Federal Election Commission. 5' In ruling that the plaintiff could not state

a private damage claim, the Court established a four-part test for implication:

145. Rondeau v. Monisee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (Supreme Court assumed target
corporation had private right of action for injunctive relief); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (private rights of action exist under rule 10b-5); J.I.
Case v. Boark, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (holding that private rights of action could be maintained
for violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex
Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980) (target corporation had standing to seek equitable relief
under Williams Act); OAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971) (issuing corporation
has standing under section 13(d) but not for injunctive relief under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5).
146. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
147. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944);
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
148. The Borak Court referred to both justifications for implication. First, it held: "While
[§ 14(a)] makes no special reference to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is
'the protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where
necessary to achieve that result." J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). Next, the Court
said: "We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it is the duty of the courts to
be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose."
Id. at 433.
149. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
150. Federal Election Campaign Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. III) (repealed 1976).
151. The Commission may request the Attorney General to "institute a civil action for
relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any other appropriate
order." 2 U.S.C. § 437a(a)(7).
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First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in
favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third,
is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern
of the States, so that it would 2be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?"1

The first two parts of the Cort test are explicitly directed to ascertaining
legislative intent. The last two may also afford guidance to Congress' will,
or they may indicate the decision where Congress is, as is often the case,
silent.' 53 Regardless of the Court's intent in Cort, only four years later, in
TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (TAMA), 54 the Court explicitly stated the primary role of legislative intent.
TAMA was a suit for enforcement of the federal Investment Advisors
Act.15 In refusing to imply plaintiff's claim to enforce the act, the Court
for the first time explicitly discarded the last two prongs of the structural
Cort test and relied solely on the absence of evidence of congressional intent
that the statute support a private damage suit. The Court held:
[T]he Act here involved concededly was intended to protect the victims
of the fraudulent practices it prohibited. But the mere fact that the
statute was designed to protect advisers' clients does not require the
implication of a private cause of action for damages on their behalf
. . . . The dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to
create any such remedy. Having
answered that question in the negative,
56
our inquiry is at an end.1

After TAMA, the Court reiterated several times its refusal to imply any
element of a claim beyond the all but expressed mandate of Congress.- 7

152. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).
153. The lower courts did not interpret the Cort test as being one of limitation and went
on implying private enforcement. See Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1978) (Rivers
& Harbors Appropriations Act); Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th
Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1975) (section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Wilson v.
First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 444 U.S. 959
(1979) (section 206 of Investment Advisors Act of 1950); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Org. Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1977) (section 11(e) of
Federal Home Loan Bank Act); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) (section 296 of Investment Advisors Act of 1940).
154. 444 U.S. 11 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TAMA].
155. 15 U.S.C. § 80(b) (1940).
156. TAMA, 444 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added). The legislative history of the Investment
Advisors Act contained strong evidence of an affirmative legislative decision not to allow private
damage suits. Id. at 24. Even under Cort, the Court would not be free to ignore a plain
expression of congressional refusal to provide a remedy. Accordingly, it was not necessary for
the Court to go as far as it did in TAMA and require affirmative expression of legislative
intent.
157. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
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Although the strict legislative intent position occasionally wavers,"5 8 the present posture of the Court means that the "pure federal strain" is essentially
extinct.
Once the Supreme Court began greatly contracting implied private rights
of action, the question of what court should hear the remaining actions
resurfaced. As Cort v. Ash illustrates, when a private litigant seeks to enforce
the substantive prohibitions of a federal statute in a private suit for damages
in federal court, the court may ask whether it can imply this enforcement
mechanism from the silence of Congress. If the federal court finds that it
cannot imply a private enforcement element from the federal statute, state
law may supply the missing element. This would occur, for instance, where
state corporation law authorizes private plaintiffs to sue for corporate violations of law, state or federal. 5 9 An action to enforce that state corporation
law presents the jurisdictional question squarely.
The traditional theory clearly contemplates federal jurisdiction over some
of these cases in which state law supplies an element of enforcement. Traditional theory would thus allow state legislatures or common law to create
the elements missing from Congress' acts.16° Since almost every hybrid case
reflects a failure by Congress to commit itself to private enforcement of its
acts, allowing the federal courts to entertain as federal a suit where only
state law authorizes private enforcement would be allowing the states to
create private actions to enforce federal statutes where Congress would not
do so. Thus, not only is the traditional theory unprincipled and, accordingly,
158. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). for
instance, the Court in a 5 to 4 decision sustained implication of a private claim to enforce the
federal Commodity Exchange Act. However, that decision rested on the existence of an implied
private remedy before Congress reenacted the law in the form before the Court. Thus, the
Court had only to find that Congress had not intended to take the action away.
159. See, e.g., Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974). There,
the court held that acts allegedly in violation of the federal election campaign law amounted
to violation of the corporation law of New York, which makes corporate officers liable for
losses resulting from "illegal acts or acts against public policy." Id. at 763.
160. The extension of federal jurisdiction over hybrid cases under the pragmatic theory
always rested on a disregard of the source of the elements of justiciability, standing, and
statement of a claim, which have attracted so much attention from the current Supreme Court.
An illustration appears in Cohen's discussion of Smith. Cohen, supra note 5, at 898-99. In
Smith, the federal element was whether the bond act was constitutional. Cohen had noted that
the state-authorized plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of an act of Congress faced a
serious standing problem. He contented himself with noting further, however, that the question
of jurisdiction is "prior" to such issues as standing. As the impact on the jurisdiction issue
of the Court's private action decisions reflects, such a question cannot be so lightly dismissed.
Assuming that the plaintiff lacks standing to enforce the federal act directly, a motion to
dismiss the federal claim on standing grounds would leave the plaintiff clothed only in his
state-created claim over which jurisdiction is pendent, at most. Under normal doctrines of
pendent jurisdiction, dismissal of the state claim from federal court would follow. United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). If Smith could be thus easily dispensed with by a
technical failure to move for dismissal in the correct order, a lot of academic and judicial ink
has been wasted. Indeed, although the jurisdictional question is technically prior to the standing
problem, if the plaintiff's standing were sufficiently dubious, the Court should even have
dismissed the federal claim on jurisdictional grounds as frivolous, insubstantial, or made solely
to acquire jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
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inadequately predictive, but also it is potentially overinclusive, extending
beyond the policy behind federal question jurisdiction, to protect litigants
whom Congress did not authorize in a private action to "rely on federal
law." 61 Of course, the absence of principled standards also establishes a
situation of potential underinclusiveness, where the judiciary may undervalue
the "federalness" of a claim that should, on objective criteria, be entitled
to federal jurisdiction.
The remainder of this article will suggest an alternative to the traditional
theory and indicate how the new theory would avoid the problems of unpredictability, overinclusiveness, and underinclusiveness.

II.

THE PROBLEM: A BROKEN COMPASS THROUGH A FOREST
OF HYBRID PLANTS

A. The Flora
In the private action cases, the Supreme Court found the claims of successive plaintiffs to be inadequate. In so doing, the holdings, if not the
opinions, constitute a guide to the essential elements of a federal claim. In
Cort v. Ash, the Court found that a private plaintiff could not state a claim
for the relief of damages under the federal law. 62 In National Railroad
6
Passenger Corp. v. National Association of RailroadPassengers (Amtrak)'
the Court found that no private party could state a claim to enforce the
federal law at all-only public enforcement through the attorney general was
available. 64 In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 61 the Court found that the
particular private plaintiff (the tender offeror in a securities dispute) could
not state a claim for any relief at all for violation of the federal law governing
tender offers. 166 In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,'67 the
Court held that no one could enforce the particular provisions of the federal,
6
aid-to-the-handicapped law; they were simply precatory1 1
These cases reveal that the elements of plaintiff's claim may be divided
roughly as follows. The body of law plaintiff invokes must (1) establish the
substance of rights' 69 and (2) provide for enforcement of the rights 70° (3) in

161. Currie, supra note 4, at 278.
162. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82-85 (1975).
163. 414 U.S. 453 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Amtrak].
164. Id. at 464-65.
165. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
166. Id. at 45.
167. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
168. Id. at 31-32.
169. In each hybrid case addressed here, the federal statute does create a substantive standard
of behavior. When, on at least one occasion, Congress created federal jurisdiction but not a
federal substantive standard, the Court confronted a very difficult jurisdictional problem, which
it ultimately resolved by creating a body of federal common law to govern the area. Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
170. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1.
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172 (5) with the remedy
a private suit' 7 ' (4) at the instance of this plaintiff
7 3
plaintiff seeks against defendant (6) in a specific court. If federal law fails
to establish any of elements (1) through (5), but state law fills the gap, a
hybrid situation results. Whether the sixth element is satisfied is, of course,
the ultimate question addressed here.
In an opinion dissenting from the decision in Cannon v. University of
74
Justice Powell first made explicit the problems in extending
Chicago,1
federal question jurisdiction to cases where some of the elements of plaintiff's
claim are not federal. In Cannon, the Court had implied a private right to
enforce Title IX of the Education Act of 1972, which imposed certain
conditions on the recipients of federal education money. 17 Justice Powell's
analysis started with the majority's citation to InternationalAssociation of
Machinistsv. CentralAirlines176 to support its implication of Cannon's claim.
The federal statute in Machinists had required airlines and their unions to
agree to binding arbitration of certain disputes.177 There, the Supreme Court
had held that the union's enforcement of an arbitration award emerging
from the federally mandated agreement to arbitrate arose under federal law
for jurisdictional purposes.178 As Justice Powell accurately noted, the Machinists Court assumed it was dealing with a private action to enforce the
agreement "and the only issue was whether this already existing private cause
of action could be brought in federal court.' ' 79 Accordingly, Justice Powell
noted: "Although as a practical matter this result entails many of the same
problems involved in the implication of a private cause of action, . . . at
80
least analytically the problems are quite different."'
8
A few pages later,' ' Justice Powell describes the similarities in the problems:
Because a private action implied from a federal statute has as an element
the violation of the statute the action universally has been considered to
present a federal question over which a federal court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, when a federal court implies a private
action from a statute, it necessarily expands the scope of its federalquestion jurisdiction.
It is instructive to compare decisions implying private causes of action
to those cases that have found nonfederal causes of action cognizable
by a federal court under § 1331. E.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title &

171. Amtrak, 414 U.S. 453.
172. Piper, 430 U.S. 1.
173. Cori, 422 U.S. 66. See also TAMA, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), and supra notes 155-58 and
accompanying text.
174. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
175. Education Act of 1972, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1972).
176. 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
177. Id.at 683.
178. Id.at 690-91.
179. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 734 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 734-35.
181. Id.at 746 n.17.
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Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). Where a court decides both that federallaw elements are present in a state-law cause of action, and that these
elements predominate to the point that the action can be said to present
a "federal question" cognizable in federal court, the net effect is the
same as implication of a private action directly from the constitutional
or statutory source of the federal-law elements. To the extent an expansive
interpretation of § 1331 permits federal courts to assume control over
disputes which Congress did not consign to the federal judicial process,
it is subject to the same criticisms
of judicial implication of private
82
actions discussed in the text.1
As both the opinion of the Court and Justice Brennan's dissent in
Wheeldin v. Wheeler illustrate, 83 the Court had previously treated the implication of a private claim as separate from the jurisdictional analysis.
Whether a federal question is cognizable requires interpretation of the jurisdictional statute, regardless of whether that analysis is based on the traditional quantum of federalism theory as set forth above, or on the more
principled theory proposed below. Whether to imply a private action from
a particular substantive statute is an inquiry directed at the act in question,
reduced, as set forth above, to the legislative intent in passing the particular
act itself.
As formulated in Cannon, Justice Powell's position appropriately begins
to address the problem of whether state law can supply the elements of a
plaintiff's federal claim, a problem which earlier judges and commentators,
applying traditional standards, had simply overlooked. As far as the Smith
type of case is concerned, the traditional commitment that some case with
a state law private enforcement mechanism, like the hybrid cases of the
Moore type, can command federal question jurisdiction is simply inconsistent
with the Court's decisions not to extend federal private enforcement beyond
the express will of Congress. The question is the right one, but Justice
Powell's solution is both wrong and dangerous. The Powell formulation is
particularly problematical, as is set forth below, when applied to hybrid
cases of the second, or Jackson Transit, type.
In Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 84 decided a year
after Justice Powell opined in Cannon, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit pursued his suggestions. Zeffiro was an action to enforce a trust
indenture. 85 Trust indentures are subject to the federal Trust Indenture Act,
one of the pieces of securities legislation that came out of the New Deal.,8 6
Rather than allow a regulatory agency to supervise the area, the act actually
mandates the terms that a trust indenture must contain, including the pro-

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. (citations omitted).
373 U.S. 647, 653 (1963).
623 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1005 (1983).
1d. at 292.
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1982).
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vision that the plaintiffs in Zeffiro were seeking to enforce.'8 7 Thus, Zeffiro
looks a lot like a case of the Jackson Transit type-where Congress has
established a legal relationship normally enforceable in a private suit.
The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.' 8 Not surprisingly, the Zeffiro plaintiffs invoked Machinists.'8 9
Plaintiffs argued that the Trust Indenture Act mandates the offeror to include
specific terms in the indenture, just as the federal law in Machinistsmandated
the parties to agree to arbitrate. They asserted that the action to enforce
those federally mandated contract terms, unassailably a private action, arose
under federal law with jurisdiction under section 1331 .90
The Third Circuit rejected this contention.' 9 Instead, the court held,
Machinists had "implicitly" been overruled in Cannon, because the Cannon
92
Court had listed Machinists among its implied right of action authorities.'
The court concluded from this that, henceforth, Machinists was to be limited,
like the other private action cases, to the Cort standards. 93 In support of
its holding, the court quoted from Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon that
the effect of a liberal interpretation of section 1331 was the same as liberal
implication of private actions and concluded that it must therefore turn to
the Cort analysis. 94
The Third Circuit opinion graphically illustrates the Procrustean nature
of attempting to fit a case over the Trust Indenture Act, a statute effectuated
by federally created private relationships, into the mold of Cort. The first
Cort question is whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of plaintiff's
class. The court had no trouble with the inquiry, because both the act itself
and its legislative history expressly state that the act is to benefit the interests
of investors.' 95
The second Cort question is whether there is any indication of legislative
intent to create or deny "such a remedy." In Cort, "such a remedy" refers
back to the Supreme Court's description of the problem the four-pronged
test seeks to answer: should the Court imply "a private remedy.' 96 The
Third Circuit characterized the question as whether the statute creates an
"implied federal cause of action.' 1 97 This is a critically different question,
and the Third Circuit answered it quite differently. First, the court asked
whether there was any legislative history regarding private enforcement of

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Zeffiro, 623 F.2d at 293.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 296-97.
Cort, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
Zeffiro, 623 F.2d at 294 (emphasis that of author).
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the Trust Indenture Act. Not surprisingly, considering that Congress deliberately chose to accomplish its end by dictating the terms of a private
contract, the court of appeals easily found legislative history that Congress
intended the rights it created to be privately enforced: "[T]he legislative
history unequivocally advances the premise that the bondholders may bring
a suit for breach of the indenture provisions."' 198
The court went on to note that: "However, it does not specify the proper
forum."' 9 Accordingly, the court felt obliged to inquire whether, when
Congress created a privately enforceable relationship by statute, it intended
actions to enforce its mandate to be brought in the federal courts.
As the court of appeals' opinion acknowledged, the Supreme Court had
already addressed this question in TAMA. 2°° TAMA is chiefly noteworthy
for setting forth the new restrictive principles for implying private damage
suits from federal statutes. The second aspect of TAMA, which is of interest
here, arose because the statute there involved a statutory provision allowing
investment advisors' clients to "rescind" their contracts. 20' Although the
statute spoke of the right to rescind, it was silent regarding the jurisdiction
of actions to enforce rescission; nor did the act speak of damages or other
remedies to accompany rescission. 20 2 In ruling on these issues, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that, when Congress used a common law term like
"rescission" creating legal rights between private parties, it also created a
private right of action to enforce the rights. 203 The only question remaining,
the Court noted, was a jurisdictional one. 2°4 The Court easily decided the
jurisdictional question in TAMA, holding that congressionally created private
actions certainly belonged in federal court; remitting the enforcement of
' 20 5
federal law to state court would be, in the Court's words, "anomalous.
The Court did not even inquire into whether Congress "intended" jurisdiction or if the Court had to "imply" it. Once the private suit existed,
jurisdiction followed.
The Zeffiro court apparently missed this aspect of TAMA. It held that:
From the above discussion there can be little question that the Trust
Indenture Act allows for suits by debenture holders against the trustee
for breach of the indenture. First Pennsylvania argues that such suits
are limited to state, not federal, court. Under the holding of Transamerica, absent some indication that Congress intended to limit the litigation of the federally-created right to state court, the right is enforceable
in federal court. We fail to find any such indication. To the contrary,
the legislative history indicates that Congress sought to nationalize the
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
Id.
TAMA, 444 U.S. at 18.
Id. at 19 (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 388 (1970)).
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19 n.9.
Id.
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issues of concern in the Act. There is no indication whatsoever in any
that Congress sought to restrict suits
portion of the legislative history
2
under the Act to state court. 06
However, instead of ending the analysis with this conclusion, as the TAMA
Court did, the court of appeals held that this structure merely satisfied the
second Cort test, which it again misrepresented as asking whether Congress
intended to create a "federal cause of action." 20 7 The court then proceeded
to do exactly what the Supreme Court had refused to do in TAMA-it
subjected plaintiff's claim to the gauntlet of the remaining two Cort tests:
(1) whether a private remedy is consistent with the legislative scheme, and
(2) whether the subject matter is one traditionally relegated to state law such
'that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law. 20 8 Like its treatment of the second Cort test, the court of appeals
again misrepresented the third Cort test as whether a "'federal"remedy is
209
consistent with the legislative scheme.
Ultimately, the court of appeals did find that the Trust Indenture Act
met the remaining Cort tests. In discussing the reformulated third test, the
court noted that Congress sought to attack a national problem in a uniform
way and that it would be strange indeed if this federal law were to be subject
to the vagaries of the laws of the fifty states. 210 Moreover, the court noted,
the law provided for no federal regulatory enforcement; thus, absent federal
court enforcement there would be no federal enforcement of these federal
rights at all.2 1 ' On the subject of traditional state governance, the court
relied heavily on the federal source of the provisions in the trust indentures
to conclude that their "interpretation" would not be a matter of traditional
212
state law.
The point here, however, is not that the Trust Indenture Act satisfies the
Cort tests, but rather that it should not be subjected to them at all. As
TAMA illustrates, once it is decided that Congress mandated substantive
rights and created a private cause of action for their enforcement, the Cort
inquiry ends. 211 In TAMA, the Court had read Congress' use of the term
"rescission" to encompass a private action to rescind the contract. However,
as the dissenters in TAMA argued, common law rescission also should have
carried with it an implied private remedy of contract damages. 214 Yet, the
Court refused to recognize that application of the statutory term and has
never confronted the consequences of that part of the TAMA opinion. The

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Zeffiro, 623 F.2d at 298-99 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 299.
Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 299.
Id.
Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 301.
TAMA, 444 U.S. at 24.
TAMA, 444 U.S. at 30, 31 (White, J., dissenting).
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defendants petitioned for certiorari in Zeffiro. The Supreme Court held the
21 5
petition until it decided in favor of implication in Merrill Lynch v. Curran

and then denied

it.216

21
Shortly after TAMA, in a series of cases involving the Davis-Bacon Act,
the Supreme Court had another opportunity to decide how to handle cases
over federally mandated private relationships. The Davis-Bacon Act provides
that federal construction contracts shall provide for payment to construction
workers of the construction wages prevailing in their area. The cases arose
out of a dispute between a consortium of universities that built a nuclear
accelerator under contract with the Atomic Energy Commission and certain
of their employees. The employees contended that they were performing
work covered by the prevailing wage requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act
and not being paid the required wages. They brought two actions.
The first, McDaniel v. University of Chicago,2"8 arose before Cort v. Ash.
There, the employees claimed, and defendant did not deny, that defendant's
contract with the AEC contained the prevailing wage stipulations required
by the act.219 Referring to the readiness of the Supreme Court to make
"effective the Congressional purpose" 220 under the pre-Cort law, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had no trouble implying a private "right
of action under the contractual provisions required by [the Act]."2'2 The
court characterized plaintiffs' complaint as one "to enforce defendant's
contractual commitment" ' m but characterized plaintiffs' "cause of action"
as "under the Davis-Bacon Act." 22a The court noted federal jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,224 but said nothing about any "arising under"
problem. That term the Supreme Court decided Cort v. Ash. It then granted
certiorari in McDaniel, but vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Cort and another private action case, Securities Investors
Protective Corp. v. Barbour.225
The court of appeals reaffirmed the decision. 226 On remand, the court was
slightly clearer about the difference between the employees' claims as third
party beneficiaries of the contract between defendant and the United States
to pay the prevailing wage and the claim to be enforcing the statutory
7

215. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
216. Zeffiro, 623 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1005 (1982).
217. Davis-Bacon Act § 1, 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1982).
218. McDaniel v. Univ. of Chicago (I), 512 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded,
423 U.S. 810 (1975), aff'd on remand, McDaniel (I), 548 F.2d 689 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1033 (1978).
219. McDaniel (1), 512 F.2d at 584.
220. Id.at 586-87.
221. Id. at 587.
222. Id. at 588.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 589.
225. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
226. McDaniel v. Univ. of Chicago (II), 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1033 (1978).
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mandate that workers be paid the wage. The court focused on the statutory
mandate and simply ran the act through the Cort v. Ash four-part test,
concluding that a private enforcement remedy for the statute must be implied. 227 In passing, however, the court indicated that the action under the
28
contract, standing alone, would not be cognizable in federal court. 2 The
229
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Almost immediately thereafter, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Seventh Circuit and ruled
20
that the same type of action did not arise under the Davis-Bacon Act. 1
The unsuccessful employees did not petition for certiorari.
In the next round of litigation, UniversitiesResearch Association v. Coutu, 23'
the universities defended their Davis-Bacon Act position on the ground that
their contract with the United States contained no commitment to pay the
prevailing wage; rather, it merely acknowledged that any such work would
be contracted out. 232 In response, the employees contended that the employer
used them for Davis-Bacon work and underpaid them and that the Federal
Government did nothifig to effectuate the act. 233 The issue was thus squarely
joined: absent a contract, can a private employee bring a suit for back wages
to enforce the statutory mandate that a contractor with the United States
doing Davis-Bacon Act work must provide for payment of the prevailing
wage? The Supreme Court said no. Applying the formalist analysis fully
developed in TAMA, the Court easily found that, in requiring contracts to
include the prevailing wage, the act showed that Congress intended no more
than a directive to the federal funding agency and that the existing express
23
private remedies23 4 precluded any implication of further private actions.
Although noting the conflict between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, a
unanimous Supreme Court distinguished the Seventh Circuit decision in favor
of a private claim on the grounds that the defendant in that case had actually
concluded a contract with the United States for the prevailing wage. The
to the
Court noted, however, that "some of our reasoning arguably applies
236
question whether the Act creates any implied right of action."
Another view of the Seventh Circuit's decision to imply a private action
in McDaniel, and one which distinguishes it determinatively from the Supreme Court decision in Coutu, is that the question before the Seventh
Circuit was not whether a private action should be implied from the Davis227. Id.at 695.
228. "[T]his status as a third party beneficiary might well support an action for breach of
contract in state court, or in federal court if diversity jurisdiction were satisfied." McDaniel
(II), 548 F.2d at 693 n.2 (1977) (emphasis added).
229. See supra note 218.
Glynn v. Capeletti Bros., 621 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1980).
230. United States ex rel.
231. 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
232. Id. at 764-65.
233. Id. at 767-68.
234. Id. at 770.
235. Id. at 783-84.
236. Id. at 769 n.19.
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Bacon Act. Instead, the Seventh Circuit case again posed the question whether,
when Congress chooses to use a traditional privately enforceable legal mechanism to effectuate a federal mandate, an action to enforce the mandate
"arises under" federal law and thus belongs in federal court.
The Supreme Court came closest to addressing the question directly in

Jackson Trsnsit Authority v. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit
Union,23 7 decided in the term after Coutu. Jackson Transit sought to invoke
federal jurisdiction over a suit to enforce contracts which Congress required
as a condition of the receipt of federal funds. At the outset, the Supreme
Court characterized the inquiry as follows:
While the Court of Appeals treated this as a private right of action
case, it does not fit comfortably in that mold. Indeed, since [the Act]
contemplates protective arrangements between grant recipients and unions
as well as subsequent collective bargaining agreements between those
parties, .

.

. it is reasonable to conclude that Congress expected the §

13(c) agreement and the collective bargaining agreement, like ordinary
contracts, to be enforceable by private suit upon a breach. 38
The Court then continued, however, to make an inquiry very much like the
one suggested by Justice Powell: "The issue, then, is not whether Congress
intended the union to be able to bring contract actions for breaches of the
two contracts, but whether Congress intended such contract actions to set
'239
forth federal, rather than state, claims.
In so ruling, the Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that, once
congressional "contemplation" of enforcement by private suit is established,
federal private enforcement follows by operation of section 1331 alone. The
Court disposed of plaintiff's precedents as establishing only that "suits to
enforce contracts contemplated by federal statutes may set forth federal
claims and that private parties in appropriate cases may sue in federal court
to enforce contractual rights created by federal statutes. But [such precedents]
do not dictate .the result in this case.''240 Moreover, although the Court
denied that the inquiry was governed by the implied private action precedents, 24' its inquiry certainly resembled that mandated in the decision not
to imply i damage action in TAMA:
Whenever we determine the scope of rights and remedies under a
federal statute, the critical factor is the congressional intent behind the
particular provision at issue. Thus, if Congress intended that § 13(c)
agreements and collective bargaining agreements be "creations of federal
law," and that the rights and duties contained in those contracts be
federal in nature, then the union's suit states federal claims. Otherwise,
2 2
the union's complaint presents only state law claims. 4

237.

457 U.S. 15 (1982).

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

20-21 (citation omitted).
21.
22.
22-23 (citations omitted).
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The language of the statute, the Court found, was "not conclusive. '243
However, the Court continued, the legislative history of the statute "is
conclusive" :'Congress made ii absolutely clear that it did not intend to create a
body of federal law applicable to labor relations between local governmental entities and transit workers. Section 13(c) would not supersede
state law, it would leave intact the exclusion of local government employers from the National Labor Relations Act, and state courts would
retain jurisdiction to determine the application of state policy to local
government transit labor relations. Congress intended that § 13(c) would
be an important tool to protect the collective bargaining rights of transit
workers, by ensuring that state law preserved their rights before federal
aid could be used to convert private companies into public entities. See
109 Cong. Rec. 5673 (1963) (remarks of Senator Morse) (if city proposed
to reject collective bargaining, it would be ineligible for federal aid). But
Congress designed § 13(c) as a means to accommodate state law to
collective bargaining, not as a means to
2 substitute a federal law of
collective bargaining for state labor law. '

In essence, the Court found that, in this particular statute, Congress chose
the unusual, but not unprecedented, device of enticing a change in state law
rather than laying its mandate directly on the relationship between the parties
themselves. 246 Accordingly, the Court concluded, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that the federal franchise ended where the state law began,
and any effort to enforce the private outcome that ensued from the change
in state law was a creation of state law not cognizable in the federal courts. 247
Justice Powell, along with Justice O'Connor, concurred separately in
Jackson Transit.24 The narrow but important disagreement between Justice
Powell and the Court illustrates Justice Powell's position. In Jackson Transit,
the Court acknowledged the existence of legal rights between the private
parties, but concluded that Congress had intended to affect the parties' legal
rights through the vehicle of state law rather than federal law. The legislative
history was plentiful and, as the Court saw it, reflected a strong and consistent congressional intent (for reasons largely peculiar to the subject matter
of the legislation)249 to withhold the aegis of federal law from the private
243. Id. at 23.
244. Id. at 24.
245. Id. at 27-28.
246. See Hart, supra note 2, at 525-39.
247. Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 29.
248. Id. at 29 (Powell, J., concurring).
249. Section 13(c) of the Federal Urban Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §1609(c), at issue
in Jackson Transit,*was directed at the problem of transferring employees formerly covered by
the federal National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982), to public employment.
The NLRA explicitly excludes such employees from coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Despite many
attempts, organized labor has never succeeded in getting a public-employee labor relation statute
through Congress. Most states have now passed statutes addressing the subject in whole or in
part. See, e.g., State Employer-Employee Relations Act, 10.3 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3512-3524
(West 1983); State Employee Relations Act, 1975 Conn. Acts 318 (Reg. Sess.); Public Employee
Relations Act, 1982 Hawaii Sess. Laws 89-1; Public Labor Relations Act, 1983 I11.
Laws 1012
(effective July 1, 1984); Public Employment Relations Act, IowA CODE § 20 (1978).
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relationships. Accordingly, the Jackson Transit Court could say, as it did,
that it was addressing the ancestry of the private action that existed, 210 not
whether to add a private action to the existing federal scheme. Since the
Court found that Congress had explicitly disclaimed parenthood of such
private action as did exist, the Court did not have to decide what it would
do where Congress was less instructive.
Justice Powell desired to address his issue; his concurring opinion exists
solely to announce the standards to guide the courts where strong indications
of legislative intent are absent. According to Justice Powell, the restrictive
part of the decision in TAMA-refusing to imply private actions-provides
the answer. 25' Under these standards, as Justice Powell asserted, no strong
indication of Congress' intent to defer to state law is required. To the
contrary, Justice Powell would establish the presumption that, "in the absence of an unambiguous expression of Congressional intent, ' 22 private
legal relationships created by Congress are to be governed by state law and
excluded from federal court.
Justice Powell assumes that, if Congress wished to place the mandate of
federal law behind the private legal relationships it addressed, it would do
so explicitly. Thus, in situations where the federal law bears directly on the
private relationship and the statute and history are silent or ambiguous
regarding whether the private relationship is to be governed by federal law
enforceable in federal court, Justice Powell's theory would establish a rule
of no implication of federal governance.
Thus, after the decisions from Cort to TAMA established that the federal
courts should not create remedies in the absence of unambiguous direction
from Congress, the overinclusiveness of the traditional standard became
apparent. Assuming the continued viability of the Court's private action
decisions, the argument for the extension of jurisdiction over Moore-type
hybrids, where Congress has not created the plaintiff's claim, should be laid
to rest.
Near, if not next, to the Moore-type hybrids on the continuum are the
cases, like Jackson Transit and Zeffiro, where Congress has used a private
mechanism to effectuate federal law. Under Justice Powell's theory, the
same concerns for the limited franchise of the federal courts should again
dictate a withholding of federal jurisdiction.
B. Powell's Path
In essence, Justice Powell wants to answer the traditional inquiry into
what "federal" cases are by the same techniques the Court has applied to
its private action inquiry. As set forth above, this avenue of analysis is
250.
251.
252.

Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 21.
Id. at 30 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id.

1984]

FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

relevant to cases like Smith,253 but it is fatally flawed as a means of understanding federal question jurisdiction, in general, and of applying federal
question jurisdiction to the private vehicle cases like Zeffiro, in particular.
Regardless of its propriety, one thing is immediately apparent: the requirement that Congress unambiguously manifest its intent will operate to
exclude cases from the federal system. This is exactly the effect of TAMA.
Under Cort the Court merely asked for any indication of congressional intent
to imply or deny a private remedy. Since TAMA, the Court has required
an affirmative and unambiguous indication of Congress' intent to create a
remedy in each case. Since legislative history is rarely one-sided and unambiguous,25 4 after TAMA, the implication of private remedies dropped
radically.
Although Justice Powell commingles the questions, there are actually
several matters at issue when Congress uses a private mechanism for insertion
of federal standards into the world: (1) Is the private behavior required a
matter of federal or state substantive law? (2) If federal law, is it enforceable
in the courts of the federal system or only in the courts of the state? (3) If
state law, is it subject to federal preemption where it conflicts with the
statutory mandate?
Absent unambiguous expression of the will of Congress, Justice Powell
would answer the first question by presuming that state substantive law
governs the private behavior. It is, of course, possible to construe Congress'
intent that way. The unarticulated premise of this position is that, by choosing the vehicle of a contract, a traditional creature of state common law,
Congress must have been intending it to be treated under state law.
However, every avenue of analysis rebuts this construction. First, this
writer has searched the precedents without finding a single case in which
substantive actions explicitly mandated by Congress are assumed not to be
federal substantive law. 25 5 In his seminal work on the relationship between
federal and state law,2 6 Henry Hart noted "the body of federal law directly
governing private activity springs mainly from a statutory base." ' 2 7 Professor
258
Hart later characterizes these as "federally created rights."
Perhaps because of this basic assumption that, insofar as Congress is
explicit, it creates federal substantive law, few courts actually articulate this
253. See supra notes 92-105 and notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
254. Pillai, supra note 19, at 37-38; Note, CongressionalIntent, supra note 19, at 1447;
Note, Implication of a Private Right, supra note 19, at 1011-13.
255. Even where the federal courts confront an ambiguous or incomplete federal statute,
they treat the decision of whether to adopt state law standards as the rule of decision as an
exercise of federal court competence. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law". Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L.
REv. 797, 803-05 and cases cited n.5 (1957); See also Comment, Adopting State Law as the
FederalRule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 823 nn.3-5 (1976).
256. Hart, supra note 2.
257. Id. at 497.
258. Id. at 498.
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premise, even in the cases where the question is arguably debatable. Addressing the problem of how to fill lacunae in Congress' scheme, the Court
in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States29 came as close as it ever has.
There, the Court had to decide whether to apply state law or to create
federal law to determine the duties of a payor to give notice of forgery of
a check issued by the Treasurer of the United States. In setting forth the
ground rules for its decision, the Court outlined the fundamental position
that rights and duties created by federal statute are federal.
We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the rule of Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins does not apply to this action. The rights and duties
of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed
by federal rather than local law. When the United States disburses its
funds or pays it debts, it is exercising a constitutional function or power.
This check was issued for services performed under the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1935. The authority to issue the check had its origin
in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and was in no
way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or of any other state. The
duties imposed upon the United States and the rights acquired by it as
a result of the issuancefind their roots in the same federal sources. M
In two other instances when the Court has had occasion to consider the
role of state law in filling congressional interstices, it has excluded at the
outset the instances where Congress. has expressed itself affirmatively. Deitrick v. Greaney 261and D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC262 both involved
determinations of the "extent and nature of the legal consequences" of a
federal statutory command. 263 In Deitrick, the Court had to decide whether
a bank was estopped.to assert as a defense its own official's violation of
federal banking law. The Court noted:
[I]t
is the federal statute which condemns as unlawful respondent's acts.
The extent and nature of the legal consequences of this condemnation,
though left by the statute to judicial determination are nevertheless to
be derived from it and the federal policy which it has adopted. We have
recently held that the judicial determination of the legal consequences
which flow from acts condemned as unlawful by the National Bank Act
involves decision of a federal, not a state question.26
The Court held that federal substantive law must also govern the estoppel
265
question, which was not addressed directly by Congress.
D'Oench, Duhme, also involving a dispute over liability for commercial
paper, turned on an estoppel question even more remote from the federal
259. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
260. Id. at 366 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). One paragraph later, the Court again
characterized its decision as choosing the "applicablefederal rule. " Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
261. 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
262. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
263. Deitrick, 309 U.S. at 200.
264. Id. at 200-01 (citations omitted).
265. Id.
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55

statute than Deitrick. In D'Oench, Duhme, the wrongdoer seeking to raise
the estoppel did not act for the purpose of violating the federal banking
laws, but the passage of the federal law subsequent to his act caused such
a violation to occur. Relying chiefly on Deitrick, the Court nonetheless
266
decided to apply federal substantive law to the estoppel question.
Justice Jackson's concurrence is the most interesting part of D'Oench,
Duhme. Justice Jackson thought the choice of law to apply to the estoppel
question deserved a more thorough treatment than the majority did. In
answering, he expressed somewhat more explicitly the reach of federal substantive law. He began, properly, with the Rules of Decision Act mandate
that state law apply except where the laws of Congress otherwise require or
provide. 267 Here again, Justice Jackson expressed the only relevant proposition: a ch6ice of law question arises, he opined, only because "no federal
statute purports to define the Corporation's rights as a holder of the note
in suit or the liability of the maker thereof. ' 268 Significantly, even in opting
for the adoption of state substantive law in Board of County Commissioners
v. United States,269 Justice Frankfurter began by stating that "[T]he issue
is uncontrolled by any formal expression of the will of Congress.''270
That a federal statutory source of the command amounts to federal substantive law is most graphically illustrated in Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson
Co. 27' Sola was originally a diversity case for breach of a license under a
patent. 2 2 The Seventh Circuit Court of-Appeals ruled that the defendant's
acceptance of a license estopped it from denying the validity of the patent. 271
The Supreme Court reversed. Holding that when an issue addressed by federal
law arose in a diversity case, federal law still governed, the Court said:
It is familiar doctrine that the prohibition of a federal statute may
not be set at naught, or its benefits denied, by state statutes or state
common law rules. In such a case our decision is not controlled by Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. There we followed state Jaw because
it was the law to be applied in the federal courts. But the doctrine of
that case is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which
the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes
that legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal
law having its source in those statutes, rather than by local law. When
a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and nature of
the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the statute
to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the answers
to which are to be derived from the statute and the federal policy which

266. D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 459.
267.

Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).

268. D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 468.
269.
270.

308 U.S. 343 (1939).
Id. at 349.

271.
272.

317 U.S. 173 (1942).
Id.at 173-74.

273. Jefferson Elec. Co. v. Sola Elec. Co., 125 F.2d 322, rev'd, 317 U.S. 173 (1942).

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:17

it has adopted. To the federal statute and policy, conflicting state law
and policy must yield. 74
The Court then ruled that local doctrines of estoppel could not be applied
to thwart the prohibitions of the federal antitrust laws. 275 Accordingly, at a
minimum, the explicit, affirmative commands of federal statutes are federal
substantive law.
Generally, the federal statutes at issue mandate that the parties make
276
explicit arrangements, usually embodied in a contract, with each other.
They also sometimes require a party to make a commitment to the United
States. 277 One might argue, accordingly, that the mandate of federal law
extends only to making the federally mandated private arrangement, not to
abiding by it. Under this scenario, state law would dictate whether parties
to federally mandated commitments must generally abide by them and what
they mean.
This contention is largely inconsistent with Sola, Deitrick, and D'Oench,
Duhme. In each of those cases, a state law defense of estoppel was raised
to defeat completely the command of a federal statute. Although acknowledging that state substantive law might play a role where Congress had left
open the "extent and legal consequences" of its commands, the Court ruled
in each case that the general enforceability of the federal command was a
federal matter.
As Professor Hart notes, many of the federally mandated private arrangements or commitments to the United States are embodied as a condition of
the receipt of federal funds.2 7 1 In a separate line of cases, the Supreme Court
has also held that such commitments are not merely concluded, but are also
binding and enforceable as a matter of federal law. 279 Just recently in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, the Court reiterated:
[O]ur cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on
which it shhll disburse federal money to the States. Unlike legislation
enacted under § 5, however, legislation enacted pursuant to the spending
power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds,
the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.Y10

Both King v. Smith 21' and Rosado v. Wyman"' did hold the states liable
to abide by the substantive terms of the grant agreements required by federal
law. The matter of remedy was disputed: in King, the Court struck down

274.

Sola, 317 U.S. at 176 (citation omitted).

275.

Id.

276. Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1982); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151a-152.
277. Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1982).
278. Hart, supra note 2, at 497.
279. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); see also
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
280. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
281. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
282. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).

1984]

FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

the nonconforming provision of state law; in Rosado, the Court instructed
the trial court to allow the state to choose between changing its nonconforming practice and foregoing further federal funds. 213 In both cases, however, the federal nature of enforceability was assumed.
In addition to lacking precedent, the presumption that Congress intends
the legal relationships it creates to be governed by state law subjects the
federal legal norms to being overwhelmed by hostile or inconsistent doctrines
of state law. For example, in Jackson Transit, the Supreme Court noted
from the extensive legislative history that Congress did not intend to create
a federal law of public employee collective bargaining and concluded from
this that Congress also did not intend such mandate as it explicitly expressed
on the subject to amount to federal substantive law. First, it is not at all
clear that the Court's premise supports its conclusion. There is a big difference between establishing a federal labor law for all public employees and
imposing, as a condition of federal funds that the applicant is free to forgo,
the discrete, enumerated protections of the law in Jackson Transit.28 Second,
even if the Court were correct in Jackson Transit, Justice Powell is attempting
to erect a general presumption against federal law based on the legislative
285
history of the law at issue in Jackson Transit, which may well be sui generis.
Certainly, the consequences that flowed from Jackson Transit should
prevent it from being extended to where Congress has less clearly manifested
its deference to state law. One such development surfaced immediately. The
statute in Jackson Transit required federal transit grant recipients to make
contracts to continue the employees' collective bargaining rights. 2 6 One
common right is binding arbitration of labor disputes. 217 Yet many states
288
have doctrines of common law that make arbitration revocable at will.
When, after Jackson Transit, the employees of the Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid Transit Authority sought to compel their employer to arbitrate, as
the contract contemplated by the federal act required, the state courts held
that state law made the contract unenforceable; thus, Congress' will was
completely thwarted. 28 Therefore, in answer to the first question raised in

283. Id. at 421-22.
284. As set forth above, supra text accompanying notes 237-49, the federal law at issue
in Jackson Transit was designed to preserve for the employees of transit systems transferred
to the public sector through the agency of federal funds certain collective bargaining relationships
they had enjoyed in the private sector and to ensure them protective allowances should the
federally funded changes lead to their discharge or layoff. 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1982).
285. Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 29.
286. See supra note 284.
287. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 693 (1960).
288. F. ELKOtRi & E.A. ELKOURI, How ARBrrrATioN WoRKs 35-41 (3d ed. 1960).
289. Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Auth., 251 Ga. 15, 303 S.E.2d 1, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1263 (1983), rev'd and remanded
for reconsideration in light of Southland v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 27 (1984).
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this section, commentary, case law, and common sense all support the view
that private behavior required by Congress is federal substantive law.
Again, as the Court found in Jackson Transit, Congress may, of course,
choose an alternative answer and deliberately provide that the private relationships it addresses are to be governed by or subordinated to any state
law, regardless of its consistency with the federal scheme. The Court elided
the Georgia situation in Jackson Transit by noting that, independent of the
private relationship, the federal government had certain remedies, such as
funding cut-off, to enforce its will. 290 However, such remedies are extremely
clumsy and do not really justify presuming that Congress was so weak-willed
as to require private behavior, but to subject it simultaneously to the risk
of nullification.
In sum, both case law and common sense dictate that, absent compelling
contrary evidence, Congress' mandate must be treated as federal substantive
law at some level. Accordingly, congressionally created private relationships
for the effectuation of federal standards should be treated as federal substantive law.
Beyond cavil, Congress' use of a private mechanism may give rise to legal
questions not easily answerable by reference to the federal statute. As Deitrick
and its progeny illustrate, when Congress legislates in an area but does not
address particular substantive issues, the courts must decide whether to
choose federal common law or to choose to allow the substantive law of
the fifty states to apply. Thus, for example, in a suit to enforce a federally
mandated private agreement, the court might be required to interpret the
contract language, to decide whether a third party could enforce the agreement as third party beneficiary, or to decide whether a particular remedy is
available for breach. The act of adopting state law, however, remains an
291
act of federal lawmaking.
The Supreme Court has set forth, in a number of cases, the standards
for deciding whether to adopt state substantive law. In United States v.
Little Lake Misere Land Co.,2 92 the Court summarized the standard:
The Court in the past has been careful to state that, even assuming
in general terms the appropriateness of "borrowing" state law, specific
aberrant or hostile state rules do not provide appropriate standards for
federal law. In De Sylva v. Ballentine, Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion for
the Court took pains to caution that the Court's holding "does not mean
that a State would be entitled to use the word'children' in a way entirely
strange to those familiar with its ordinary usage . . . ." In RFC v.
Beavery Count, the Court concluded that "the congressional purpose
can best be accomplished by application of settled state rules as to what
constitutes 'real property' "-but again the Court foresaw that its approach
would be acceptable only "so long as it is plain, as it is here, that the
290.
291.
292.

Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 27-28.
Mishkin, supra note 256, at 803; Comment, supra note 255, at 830-33.
412 U.S. 580 (1973).
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state rules do not effect a discrimination .against
293 the Government, or
patently run counter to the terms of the Act.
More recently, in Miree v. DeKalb,294 a diversity suit by private plaintiffs
seeking to enforce a grant contract with the United States, the Court again
deferred to state law to resolve whether plaintiffs could claim third party
beneficiary status. Since the opinion explicitly acknowledges that plaintiff
made no effort to cast his diversity suit as a congressionally authorized
private action for enforcement of federal norms, the Court did not consider
the arguments of interest here. 295 Although Justice Rehnquist relied heavily
29 6
on the notion that "no substantial rights or duties of the United States"
hinged on the answer, he did acknowledge that "there has been no showing
that state [third party beneficiary] law is inadequate to achieve any federal

interest.' '297
Miree suggests the third alternative answer to the question set forth abovethat Congress intends its private mechanism for insertion of federal norms
to be governed by state substantive law, subject only to operation of the
supremacy clause when state law conflicts with the explicit federal mandate.
This alternative is also unacceptable. First, unlike Miree, most private
mechanism cases involve enforcement of an explicit congressional rule regarding what the private relationship should entail. As set forth above, such
precedents as exist support the assumption that explicit congressional commands constitute federal law. 298 Although all federal law enjoys the protection
of the supremacy clause, 29 9 the availability of a supremacy argument has not
thus far been considered a justification for assuming the governance of state
law.
A host of practical arguments also weigh against this construction. When
Congress has spoken in no uncertain terms to require behavior, application
of state law to Congress' commands would be meaningless. Where state law
is inconsistent with or hostile to federal law, the supremacy clause would
mandate a federal rule. If state law must thus be basically consistent with
the federal law, to assume that Congress was invoking state law to effectuate

293. Id. at 595-96 (citations omitted). Although Little Lake Misere, like most of the federal
adoption of state law cases, is a suit against the United States, in an oft-cited decision, DeSylva
v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), the Court did apply the same analysis to a case between
two private parties. There, as the Little Lake Misere opinion reflects, in an action to enforce
the copyright law, the Court looked to the state inheritance laws to determine the scope of the
federal statutory term "children."
294. 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
295. Id. at 33-34.
296. Id.at 31.
297. Id.at 32 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 71 (1966)).
298. See supra notes 255-75 and accompanying text.
299. "[The Supreme Court's) primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances ... [the state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (holding
a state law requiring alien registration preempted by national policies governing aliens).
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its will would do no more than to throw federal substantive norms into the
state courts. Moreover, even a cursory examination of the area reveals that,
by and large, in requiring these private mechanisms, Congress was changing
the legal norms to assert a federal interest contrary to or unsupported by
the existing body of state law. 300 This fact indicates that such cases should
be the last-rather than the first-place to presume that Congress is entrusting
its will to the uncertain mercies of local courts.
The last possibility is that, absent formal expression of legislative intent
to provide federal jurisdiction, the private suits are to be brought to the
state courts, but the state courts are charged with enforcing them as federal
substantive law. Since Justice Powell does not separate substance from
jurisdiction, it is possible to read his opinions as expressing this position. 30'
Regardless of one's opinion of the utility of this analysis, there are insurmountable problems in applying it to the exercise of federal question
jurisdiction. First, it fails entirely to take into account the existence of the
federal question statute. In section 1331, Congress, explicitly set forth that
it desired to exercise federal jurisdiction over cases arising under federal
laws. Under Justice Powell's formulation, requiring that each statute provide
explicitly for federal jurisdiction over any related actions would amend
section 1331 to read as follows:
Congress hereby provides that the federal courts have jurisdiction over
cases when Congress provides they do.
The refusal to recognize the general jurisdictional mandate of section 1331
is particularly troubling, since, in enacting substantive statutes in the century
since the passage of the general jurisdictional statute, Congress has only
sporadically expressed its jurisdictional intent on a statute-by-statute basis.
Indeed, most statute-specific expressions of federal jurisdiction create not
general federal question jurisdiction but rather'create exclusive federal ju302
risdiction.
By contrast, federal statutes intended to be enforced by private court suits
300. Even in Jackson Transit, the legislative history reveals that the statute was enacted to
remedy doctrines of state law hostile to collective bargaining. Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 19.
The Federal Trust Indenture Act was enacted explicitly to overcome the failure of local
common law to protect the bondholders. Dropkin, supra note 16, at 303-05.
301. For example, Smith, which Justice Powell cites as analogous, involved a question of
federal substantive law-whether the Bond Act was constitutional-although the state provided
the plaintiff with his remedy. Yet Justice Powell seems to indicate that Smith should have been
left to the state courts to decide. As set forth above, see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying
text, this is probably a correct treatment of Smith. The error lies in applying Justice Powell's
understanding of Smith to the cases like Zeffiro. Be that as it may, Justice Powell's willingness
to relegate questions of federal substantive law to state court indicates that this-rather than
construing the private arrangements as state law-may be what he had in mind.
302. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 309(b), 505(a), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b),
1365(a) (1982); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 § 105, 33 U.S.C. §
1415 (1982); Federal Tort Claims Act § 410, 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1982).
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often expressly provided for such private enforcement actions.0 3 Indeed, it
was the presence of these express provisions for private suits that the Court

invoked to justify its refusal to imply such actions: "[When] Congress wished
to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so .

. .

.'

Accordingly, the scarcity of separate, explicit jurisdictional provisions strongly
suggests that Congress thought it could rely on section 1331-the general

jurisdictional statute-to express its intent regarding jurisdictional questions
about any federal statute. By ignoring the general statute and searching for
evidence of specific congressional intent to establish federal jurisdiction in
each case, Justice Powell would thus guarantee that the courts will fail to

find it.
Moreover, when Congress wished to exclude actions it created from the
general jurisdictional provisions of the federal courts, it generally said so
explicitly. 305 In the rare cases where the Supreme Court has found such an
exclusion, it has acknowledged that it creates an anomaly. For example, the
federal courts have long construed the Federal Arbitration Act 30 6 to create
federal law that does not give rise to federal jurisdiction. 30 7 The Court's

reliance on the explicit statutory language and its characterization of the
exclusion of jurisdiction over Arbitration Act cases as "an anomaly" buttresses the conclusion that, absent such explicit language, where federal law
"establishes and regulates a duty," section 1331 applies routinely.

303. See, e.g., Natural Gas Act § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 717u (1982); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982); Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-210, § 211(a), 85 Stat. 744 (1971) (expired Apr. 30, 1973); Civil Rights Act, tit. VII
§ 706(0, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).
304. Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979).
305. Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982); Federal Removal Statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982); Postal Service Act, 39 U.S.C. §§401, 410 (1982).
306. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
307. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S.Ct. 927 (1983),
the Court described the arrangement as follows:
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal court
jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating
the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent
federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed. Supp. IV) or
otherwise. Section 4 provides for an order compelling arbitration only when the
federal district court would have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute;
hence, there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for
federal jurisdiction before the order can issue. E.g., Commercial Metals Co. v.
Balfour, Guthrie & Co., 577 F.2d 264, 268-69 (CA5 1978), and cases cited.
Id. at 942 n.32. Like Cone, Commercial Metals Co. v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co., 577 F.2d 264
(5th Cir. 1974), and the cases cited therein all rest on the explicit language of the Arbitration
Act. At least since 1933, the federal courts have refused to find federal jurisdiction in the face
of that clear statement of congressional will. Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert &
Sons, Inc., 62 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1933). The lower federal courts have simultaneously held
that the Arbitration Act is affirmative federal substantive law, preemptive of state law and
binding on them in diversity suits, even under the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938), which, of course, requires federal courts to apply state law in diversity cases. See,
e.g., Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
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The Declaratory Judgment Act 30 8 poses a similar problem for "arising
under" jurisdiction. By providing a party seeking to enforce a federal substantive right with a private federal claim for the relief-a declaration of
rights-the act turns what would otherwise be a nonjurisdictional federal
defense into an affirmative federal claim. With substantive federal law providing the standard of behavior and the Declaratory Judgment Act tfie
remedy, the elements of a federal claim are satisfied. Thus, even under.
Holmes' analysis, the elements of section 1331 jurisdiction should be sat j
isfied.
As set forth above, in Skelly, 30 9 the Supreme Court refused to allow this
development. In so ruling, the Court applied, without articulating very
clearly, the Jackson Transit analysis. Confronted with a claim which, including the declaratory judgment element, satisfied all elements of federal
jurisdiction, the Court examined the Declaratory Judgment Act and its
legislative history and found that Congress had clearly manifested an affirmative intent to exclude from federal court claims whose relief element
is supplied solely by the Declaratory Judgment Act.310 Thus, only a plaintiff
whose complaint would satisfy the elements of section 1331 jurisdiction
independent of the declaratory judgment remedy may sue. This limitation
of federal jurisdiction, too, rests firmly on the affirmative expression of
31
Congress' will. '
Last term in Southland v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984), the Court held explicitly that the
Arbitration Act is binding federal substantive law, governing the state courts, as well as federal
tribunals. The Court reiterated its holding in Cone that, because of the peculiar language of
the act, it does not carry with it the traditional concomitant federal question jurisdiction. Id.
at 856-57.
308. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1982).
309. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
310. Id. at 670-71.
311. Skelly was probably the easiest case, because all the plaintiff sought to prove was that
federal law, incorporated by the parties into their common law contract as a justification for
breach, was satisfied. The plaintiff in Skelly was never trying to enforce affirmative federal
law independent of the private parties' decision to agree to a federal contract defense.
The impact of Skelly is somewhat muted by a line of affirmative cases for a declaration
that federal law prevails over inconsistent state rules. The standard pattern is that the state
seeks to impose on the declaratory plaintiff a state rule inconsistent with a federal law addressing
the same subject. The supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, of course, gives the federal
law supremacy over such state regulation. Before the Declaratory Judgment Act, requirements
of ripeness meant that the objects of such regulation were required to suffer the impact of the
state law on them before they could invoke the federal mandate. They were then reduced to
using a federal defense, which under Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, does not support jurisdiction.
Since the Declaratory Judgment Act satisfies the ripeness requirement, the courts have been
confronted with actions for declaration of a federal immunity under the federal statute. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1979); Conference of Fed. Say.
& Loan v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979). There is Supreme Court dicta, followed by
several circuits, to the effect that the plaintiff's only genuine case must await the state prosecution, and thus, the preemption claim can never be anything but a defense. Public Serv.
Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952). Other circuits have characterized plaintiff's case
as the affirmative enforcement of rights under the supremacy clause, which ripens whenever
the collision between the two bodies of law crystallizes. Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d
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In sum, Justice Powell would throw out the baby with the bath water.
He correctly perceived that the traditional theory of federal question jurisdiction would admit to federal court cases where Congress has definitively
determined not to empower the plaintiff to enforce federal law through the
courts. He properly concluded that the traditional readiness to extend jurisdiction to cases where a proposition of federal law is "directly" at issue,
regardless of the source of the action, is inconsistent with the Court's recent
development of stringent new standards for implying private claims. Accordingly, cases like Smith, where a federal standard is not accompanied by
a federal claim for enforcement, will not qualify for federal jurisdiction.
When confronted with the next level of cases-where Congress establishes
a federal standard and a private claim but does not specify that the claims
will be governed by federal law enforceable in federal court-Justice Powell's
error lies in proposing to substitute the private right of action analysis for
the discarded traditional theory. As set forth above, to assume in such cases
that Congress legislates in terms of state substantive law unless it explicitly
expresses its intent to create federal law is contrary to precedent, counterintuitive and impractical. To assume that Congress does not intend federal
jurisdiction to apply to private claims it creates to enforce federal substantive
law is similarly contrary to the statutory language, precedent, and the policies
that underlie federal question jurisdiction.
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO FEDERAL QUESTION
JURISDICTION

This development greatly highlights the need for a reliable, predictive
standard for delineating a federal case-one that is neither overinclusive like
the traditional theory, nor destructively hostile to federal interests like Justice
Powell's test.
Justice Holmes' opinion in American Well Works and his dissent in Smith
provide the best solution to the problem. In an imperfect world, Holmes'
standard of "the law that creates the cause of action" satisfies the policy
of obtaining sympathetic tribunals to protect the interests of the federal
government and provides an essential measure of stability to the analysis.
The failure to give serious consideration to Justice Holmes' position is
probably due to scholars' erroneous perception that the standard is merely
useful to exclude cases from jurisdiction; put another way, Justice Holmes
has been perceived as telling what is necessary for federal jurisdiction. It is
true that Justice Holmes' standard would avoid the problem of sweeping
into federal court those cases where Congress established a federal standard
but failed to provide one or more of the elements of a private claim. This
1295 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1976); Braniff Int'l Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1978).
Under this latter analysis, the hypothetical claim for coercive relief would be a federal cause
of action; thus, the declaratory judgment action would stand.
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is so because, as set forth above, elements (1) through (5) are all required
before a court may conclude that the legislature has created a cause of
action. Thus, the Holmes standard takes care of Justice Powell's most cogent
criticism of the traditional theory.
However, the Holmes standard does not suffer from the defects of Justice
Powell's proposal to extend private action analysis to the questions presented
by the private vehicle cases like Zeffiro. Under the Holmes standard, if
Congress indicates its intent to govern a relationship giving rise to a dispute,
the policy reasons behind federal jurisdiction dictate that the disputants
should have access to a federal tribunal for resolution of their disagreement
about their relationship.
Congress indicates its intent to govern that relationship by passing laws
unmistakably directed at the disputants. Congress indicates its intent to have
their relationship governed by the judiciary, rather than some other branch
of the Federal Government, by using the vocabulary of private litigation,
including the vocabulary of remedies, even if, in legislating each time, Congress did not explicitly state that the private relationship it was creating was
to be governed by federal substantive law enforced in the federal courts.
Under Justice Holmes' formulation, the courts must then conclude that
Congress has "created a cause of action," and that suffices for federal
jurisdiction. All of the elements ((1) through (5)) of the cause are of federal
origin. As for the sixth element, it is supplied by section 1331.
Although not involving a private mechanism, the recent Supreme Court
decision in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust
(FTB),31 2 illustrates the poverty of both the traditional and the Powell theories
and how the simple, predictive Holmes formulation would function to produce right results. In FTB, the California tax authorities sought to collect
state taxes by levying against an employer benefit fund. 313 The fund would
not pay, contending that the federal Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) 3 4 precluded it from doing so. The California Franchise
Tax Board filed an action in state court with two (self-styled) "causes of
action": (1) to compel the fund to pay its arrearages, and (2) for declaratory
judgment of the parties' rights in face of the fund's contention that ERISA
315
governed its obligations and forbade it to pay.
The fund successfully removed the case to federal court, where it lost on
its substantive claims. 31 6 When the court of appeals reversed on the merits;
the state appealed, contending, inter alia, that the district court had lacked
jurisdiction. 31 7
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FTB].
Id. at 2843.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
FTB, 103 S. Ct. at 2844-45.
Id. at 2845.
Id.
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At the outset of the opinion, Justice Brennan summarized his understanding of such jurisdiction:
The most familiar definition of the statutory "arising under" limitation
is Justice Holmes' statement, "A suit arises under the law that creates
the cause of action." However, it is well settled that Justice Holmes'
test is more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come
within the district courts' original jurisdiction than it is for describing
which cases are beyond district court jurisdiction. We have often held
that a case "arose under" federal law where the vindication of a right
under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law,
and even the most ardent proponent of the Holmes test has admitted
that it has been rejected as an exclusionary principle118
Justice Brennan thus adopts uncritically the traditional position, including
the continued viability of Smith. As the paucity of Justice Brennan's authority reflects, it is not even remotely true that the Court has "often" held
a case to arise under federal law'in the Smith situation. As set forth above,
Justice Brennan's citation to the dissenting opinion in Flournoy is both
inapposite and grossly misleading. 3 9 Unlike his opening summary, Justice
Brennan's actual decision in FTB actually tracks more closely the analysis
set forth herein. Insofar as it incorporates the traditional approach, FTB
illustrates its poverty, rather than its utility.
FTB presents a peculiarly troublesome jurisdictional problem, because the
only real legal dispute between the parties-whether federal law preempts the
California tax laws-is a federal question. However, since California got to
the state court first, the fund could raise its federal preemption argument
only as a defense, which, under the well-pleaded complaint rule of Mottley,
would not support federal jurisdiction. On this ground, Justice Brennan
easily disposed of the fund's claim to federal jurisdiction over California's
3 20
affirmative enforcement claim.
The state declaratory judgment action proved more difficult. As Justice
Brennan accurately expressed it, "Whereas the question of federal preemption is relevant to appellant's first cause of action only as a potential defense,
it is a necessary element of the declaratory judgment claim." '3 2' Thus plaintiff's state declaratory judgment claim, like Smith, "turns on the construction
of federal law." 322
California, of course, invoked Skelly.3 23 However, Justice Brennan cor-

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id. at 2846 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
FTB, 103 S. Ct. at 2848.
Id. at 2849.
Id. at 2850.
Skelly, 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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rectly noted that, unlike Skelly, the defendant's affirmative, coercive suit in
FTB would be a federal one for an injuction against collection of the tax
under ERISA. 324 Certain patent cases had established that such a hypothetical
claim satisfied Skelly. a25 Thus, defendant really had two claims to federal
jurisdiction: (1) that plaintiff's claim qualified under Smith, and (2) that as
a declaratory defendant with a bona fide federal claim, it was entitled to
access to federal court under the patent cases. Justice Brennan's handling
of these issues is a peculiar admixture of the traditional theory and Justice
Powell's proposed formulation.
Although he does not sort them out, the context indicates that Justice
Brennan denied the claim based on plaintiff's case first. Quoting from the
loose language in Gully, he invokes the freedom to make a "common sense
accommodation of judgment" regarding federal jurisdiction.3 26 First, he asserts that federal jurisdiction should not attach to state declaratory judgment
suits because states do not need rapid access to ' federal court to resolve their
disputes with potential federal claimants.3a 7 Then, he invokes the traditional
fuzzy policy considerations nowhere articulated in the jurisdictional statutes:
[A]s appellant's strategy in this case shows, they [the state] may often
be willing to go to great lengths to avoid federal-court resolution of a
preemption question. Realistically, there is little prospect that States will
flood the federal courts with declaratory judgment actions; most questions will arise, as in this case, because a State has sought a declaration
in state court and the defendant has removed the case to federal court.
Accordingly, it is perhaps appropriate to note that considerations of
comity make us reluctant to snatch cases which a state has brought from
the courts of that State, unless some clear rule demands it.328
The Holmes standard would produce the same outcome. Instead of turning
on elusive "considerations of comity," Justice Holmes' theory would deny
jurisdiction on a simple structural basis. In FTB, the state's declaratory
judgment action would not qualify for federal jurisdiction, because the relief
sought-the declaratory remedy-is entirely the creation of state law. Since
federal law is not supplying all the elements of plaintiff's claim, federal
3
jurisdiction would not apply.

29

Justice Brennan's treatment of the plaintiff's second claim to jurisdictionthat the declaratory defendant's federal coercive claim supports jurisdictionis a similar combination of unjustified overreaching restrained by unprin-

324. FTB, 103 S. Ct. at 2851-52.
325. Id. at 2851 n.19.
326. Id. at 2843-45, 2852.
327. Id. at 2852.
328. Id. at 2852 n.22.
329. As it happens, the principled analysis responds to Justice Brennan's political concerns, as
well, since the availability of a state declaratory judgment remedy allows the state to enterand here, win-the race to the courthouse and thus avoid the federal court resolution of
defendant's affirmative claim that it fears.
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cipled self-imposed restrictions. As set forth above, Justice Brennan's
assumption that federal question jurisdiction may rest on a declaratory
defendant's hypothetical federal claim rests on three very shaky bases: (1)
some old lower court patent decisions 330 (2) the assertion that it is dicta
"consistent with" the Supreme Court's important declaratory judgment decision, Public Service Commission v. Wycoff 33 and (3) the "nature of the
declaratory remedy itself, which was designed to permit adjudication of
332
either party's claims of right.
Wycoff is certainly not authority for Justice Brennan's claim. In fact, in
Wycoff, the Court rejected original federal jurisdiction, on the ground that
defendant's anticipated coercive suit would not arise under federal law. When
the issue of whether a defendant with a hypothetical claim to federal preemption may remove a state enforcement case surfaced recently in a petition for
certiorari to review the decision of the Seventh Circuit denying jurisdiction,
the issue did not even get four votes for review. 333 However, an unusual
exchange of opinions over the denial of certiorari reveals the distance between
Justice Brennan's statements in FTB and the position of some of his brethren.
In his opinion in defense of the denial of certiorari, Justice Blackmun asserted
unequivocally that a defendant's hypothetical federal claim-even a claim of
preemption-would not support original federal question jurisdiction. 3 Even
Justices White and Marshall, dissenting from the denial of review, could
335
only assert that the question was an open one.
Be that as it may, assuming Justice Brennan's premise, he must thus decide
whether federal jurisdiction should apply in FTB. He denied the claim to
jurisdiction, ruling:
The express grant of federal jurisdiction in ERISA is limited to suits
brought by certain parties ... as to whom Congress presumably determined that a right to enter federal court was necessary to further the
statute's purposes. It did not go so far as to provide that any suit against
such parties must also be brought in federal court when they themselves
did not choose to sue. The situation presented by a State's suit for a
declaration of the validity of state law is sufficiently removed from the
spirit of necessity and careful limitation of district court jurisdiction that
informed our statutory interpretation in Skelly Oil and Gully to convince
us that, until Congress informs us otherwise, such a suit is not within
the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts. Accordingly,
336
the same suit brought originally in state courts is not removable either.

330.
331.
Utah v.
332.
333.
(1982).

See FTB, 103 S. Ct. at 2851 n.19.
344 U.S. 2137 (1952); FTB, 103 S. Ct. at 2851 n.19 (citing Public Serv. Comm'n of
Wycoff, 344 U.S. 2137 (1952)).
FTB, 103 S. Ct. at 2851 n.19.
Kerr McGee Co. v. Illinois, 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1049

334. FTB, 103 S. Ct. at 2853.
335. Id.
336.

Id.
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Thus, having asserted that a declaratory judgment suit is cognizable in
federal court if the declaratory defendant's hypothetical coercive action
would be federal, Justice Brennan adds a whole new requirement-that Congress must also provide expressly that suits against such defendants be
cognizable in federal court. This requirement of express jurisdictional language is very close to the Powell formulation, and it is similarly erroneous.
If ERISA provides all the necessary elements of the declaratory defendant's
hypothetical claim, and if Justice Brennan's understanding of the role of
defendant's hypothetical claim is correct, it should be unnecessary to examine
the statute afresh each time for evidence of Congress' discrete intent to
assert jurisdiction. The Powell standard is certainly incompatible with Justice
Brennan's primary authority for his assumption that federal jurisdiction may
rest on the defendant's hypothetical claim-the patent cases-because the patent
laws do not provide explicitly for federal jurisdiction of suits against patent
37
holders either.
The flaw in Justice Brennan's reasoning lies in the original assertion that
a defendant's potential coercive federal claim supplied federal jurisdiction
over the plaintiff's state declaratory action. Here, plaintiff asserted a claim
for the declaration of the validity of its own law; the state of California
338
certainly had no federal coercive action to bring, particularly under ERISA.
Construing declaratory judgment law as Justice Brennan would do would
make a whole universe of federal law enforceable-at least to the extent of
declaratory relief-by a category of plaintiffs never contemplated by Congress.
A plaintiff with no private claim to enforce the federal law would simply
seek a declaratory judgment in federal court against the parties expressly
authorized by Congress to enforce its law. The question is thus not whether,
in enacting ERISA, Congress manifested its intent that actions against the
funds be cognizable in federal court; the question is whether Congress
intended California to be enforcing ERISA at all, even to the extent of
calling for defendant's hypothetical federal action. As to that, under the
current private right of action theory, the answer is clearly negative.
In the very next part of the opinion, the Court actually ruled that California
could not enforce ERISA. The Court was forced to confront the question
directly in response to defendant's contention that plaintiff's action must be
federal, because ERISA preempts the area and ousts any possible state claim.
Accordingly, the reasoning goes, plaintiff's apparent state claim is really an
339
attempt to conceal its only possible claim, which is federal.
In denying this claim, Justice Brennan immediately had recourse to the

337. Id. at 2851 n.19.
338. Id. at 2855.
339. Id. The defendant in FTB relied on Avco v. Aero Lodge, 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1968),
aff'd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), holding that the preemptive force of the National Labor Relations
Act was so great that an employer's state court action to enforce a labor contract could be
governed only by federal law; accordingly the Court allowed defendant to remove. Id. at 343.
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implied private right of action analysis. After noting that Congress had
explicitly listed the private plaintiffs entitled to enforce ERISA in the act,
he concluded that the absence of any provision for a suit by California
precluded California from enforcing the federal law.140 Therefore, Justice
Brennan stated:
ERISA does not provide an alternative cause of action in favor of the
State to enforce its rights . . . . Therefore, even though the Court of
Appeals may well be correct that ERISA precludes enforcement of the
State's levy in the circumstances of this4 case, an action to enforce the
levy is not itself preempted by ERISA.1
Finally, defendant contended that plaintiff's claim for a declaration of
the trustees' power under the trust agreement was a matter which Congress
had consigned to the federal courts for federal common-law making.3 42 Even
there, however, when federal law was clearly to apply to the substance of
the dispute, Justice Brennan considered himself bound by the limited list of
private plaintiffs authorized by statute as to bring a declaratory judgment
suit-a list that did not include state taxing authorities. Thus, although federal
law supplied elements (1) through (3) of the plaintiff's claim, it did not
provide element (4) authorizing this particular plaintiff to sue.3 43 Since federal
law failed to provide all of the elements of the cause of action, the Court
correctly refused to recast the claim as a federal case.
Justice Brennan's handling of the federal preemption and federal commonlaw issues demonstrates the functioning of the principled standard to produce
an acceptable result through predictable reasoning. Freed of all rhetoric
about "snatches" from state courts, by requiring federal law to provide all
the elements of a cause of action; the Holmes test leaves the enforcement
of federal statutes in the hands to which Congress consigned them. This
satisfying process contrasts sharply with the first part of FTB, where Justice
Brennan asserts an undefined, overinclusive potential jurisdiction, both under
Smith and the declaratory judgment cases and then is forced to resort to
unprincipled, inappropriately stringent restrictions to deal with the case at
hand.
Two recent decisions by courts of appeal dealing with the duty of fair
representation under the Railway Labor Act also illustrate graphically the
desirability of the suggested jurisdictional analysis. In Graf v. Elgin, Joliet
& Eastern Railway Co., a" a railroad employee sued his employer for wrongful
discharge and his union for breach of the duty of fair representation. He
filed in state court, and the union removed.145 The district judge dismissed

340. FTB, 103 S. Ct. at 2855.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
344. 697 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1983).
345. Id. at 774.
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the case on the merits.3 46 When the plaintiff appealed to the Seventh Circuit,
the court raised the question of federal jurisdiction on its own. 47
Noting that fair representation cases are an amalgam of claims for breach
of the collective bargaining agreement and for breach of the federal labor
laws-in this case, the Railway Labor Act 348-the court proceeded to consider
the jurisdictional implications of both. First, as to the employee's claim for
breach of the agreement, the court noted that, unlike the analogous claim
for breach of a collective bargaining agreement under the National Labor
Relations Act, Congress has never provided specifically for jurisdiction over
3 49

railway labor agreements.

The court next considered whether the action arose under the Railway
Labor Act, but found that the statute created a duty of fair representation
only as to the union, while the employer's violation stemmed from the
agreement. 350 The court continued:

Nor does the fact that an activity is regulated by a federal statute, as
collective bargaining in the railroad industry is regulated by the Railway
Labor Act, mean that disputes between private parties engaged in that
activity arise under the statute. For example, the Supreme Court held
recently that section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1609(c), which requires transit authorities to protect the interests
of affected workers before the authority may receive federal money, does
not authorize a union to sue in federal court for all alleged violations
of the protective arrangements or of the collective bargaining agreement
embodying those arrangements. Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union. The Court in Jackson Transit
Authority did not cite Andrews; it distinguished Central Airlines by
reference to the purpose of the statutory provision involved in that case
(and not in this case); and it indicated, as it has in many other recent
cases, a reluctance to create a private right of action under a federal
statute without direct evidence that Congress desired this result. There
is no evidence that the draftsmen of the Railway Labor Act wanted the
federal courts to exercise original jurisdiction over contract disputes, as
distinct from the very limited review jurisdiction that the Act explicitly
gives them over decisions by the arbitral boards.35

346. Id.
347. Id.
348. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
349. Congress provided for federal jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements
under the NLRA in 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). That statute was sustained in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
350. Graf, 697 F.2d at 775. As the Graf court noted, the authority for the employee's
statutory fair representation claim against the union is one of the earliest examples of the
Court's pre-Cort willingness to imply private rights of action. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The statute is silent on the subject, and it is unclear whether the
present Supreme Court would have reached the same conclusion. However, the Court has not
extended TAMA so far as to overrule old private action decisions. 697 F.2d at 776 (citations
omitted).
351. Graf, 697 F.2d at 776 (citations omitted).

FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

1984]

The court of appeals ultimately concluded, however, that the contract
action belonged in federal court as an exercise of federal common law. The
court noted that the action against the employer of necessity involved some
of the same legal questions as those in the federal action against the union. 35 2
It further noted that an earlier case had held that the Railroad Labor Act
arbitration remedies extinguished any state common law contract remedies,
leaving a complete void in state law as to how the contract should be
353
interpreted.
Accordingly, the court concluded that "since a federal common law of
railroad collective bargaining contract interpretation is being applied in workers' suits against unions, it makes sense to apply it also in the worker's suit
against his employer. '354 Since the action arose under federal common law,
federal jurisdiction followed.
Although reaching the right result, the Graf court's reliance on federal
common law is certainly questionable. Recently, in Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 355 Justice Burger proferred an extremely narrow construction of federal common law, essentially limiting a it6 to areas of uniquely
federal interests and explicit congressional mandate.
The preferred analysis is reflected in the Sixth Circuit's decision in Kaschak
v. ConsolidatedRail Corp.,3 57 another suit against the employer based on a
duty of fair representation claim. The court first found that the employer's
duty to obey the collective bargaining agreement "lay at the very heart of
the statutory scheme." 3 58 The Railway Labor Act has a peculiar legislative
history, and, early on, the Supreme Court had construed the act to be in
the nature of a quasi-contract between labor and management.3 59 In exercising
its jurisdiction, the court did not even pause to contemplate whether the
courts of the states, rather than of the Federal Government, should be the
forum.
The court did take up in a footnote the suggestion that Kaschak was really
a case of whether to imply a private action from the federal statute and
ruled that, although the private action analysis would produce the same
outcome:
We do not feel, however, that a remedy need be implied in this case;
the unique nature of the RLA relieves us from having to go that far.
352.

Id. at 776-77.

353. Id. Because the act creates statutory Boards of Arbitration to enforce railway labor
agreements, such disputes rarely get into the courts. Graf came to court only because the union
had allegedly wrongfully failed to pursue the established arbitration procedures for the employees. Id. at 778.
354.

Id. at 777.

355.

451 U.S. 630 (1981).

356.

Id. at 642-46.

357. 707 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1983).
358.

Id. at 909.

359. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971), motion
granted, 401 U.S. 928 (1971).
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As noted, the RLA is quasi-contractual in nature, creating legally enforceable obligations enforceable by whatever means appropriate. Our
inquiry regarding Board jurisdiction only requires that we ask to what
extent the statute itself has defined the appropriate means for enforcing
a limited class of these obligations. The only 3question
under the RLA
°
is where an existing remedy may be enforced. Kaschak and Graf reflect the courts' discomfort with closing their doors
to cases where Congress set forth the substantive rule of behavior and created
a traditional private enforcement mechanism. Yet Graf's unprincipled leap
to the narrow ground of federal common law, because it "makes sense" 3 61
and because the contrary result would "be peculiar," 3 62 compares most
unfavorably to the structural analysis in Kaschak.
CONCLUSION

In sum, traditional jurisdiction theory, resting on an unreliable ad hoc
analysis about the federal quality of each dispute, was always an unprincipled
and unsatisfying solution. Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent development of strict construction of implied federal claims has brought to light
the inadequacy of the traditional theory to deal with the marginal cases
where state law provides an element of the plaintiff's claim. Justice Powell
has proposed to throw away all jurisdictional theory and to rest the jurisdictional analysis of the same basis as the private claim cases-a search for
congressional intent. This proposal is unsuited for jurisdictional questions
and leads to an undesirable underinclusive result. The application of Powell's
solution to the cases where Congress imposes federal norms through the
vehicle of private legal relationships illustrates its failure.
Instead of searching for jurisdiction theory from the implied action cases,
the courts should turn, or return, to the straightforward analysis set forth
by Justice Holmes.

360.
361.
362.

Kaschak, 707 F.2d at 909 n.15.
Graf, 697 F.2d at 777.
Id.

